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I. INTRODUCTION
The issue of whether the state is morally justified in affording content
creators a legal right to exclude others from the content of their creations
is a sharply contested issue in information ethics, law, legal theory,
philosophy, and policy. Once taken for granted as legitimate, intellectual
property rights have come under fire during the last fifty years as evolving
digital information technologies have severed the link between expression
of ideas and such traditional material-based media as books and magazines.
These advances in digital technology have called attention to unique
features of intellectual content thought to problematize the legitimacy of
legal intellectual property protections. Any piece of intellectual content,
for example, can be simultaneously appropriated by everyone, as the
matter is sometimes put, without thereby diminishing the supply of that
content available to others.
I will call these rights “intellectual property rights” for convenience.
No presupposition is made that content is, as a conceptual matter,
property or that it is something that can be owned. On my view, it does
not matter whether content counts as property or not; that issue strikes
me as a distraction. What is important is whether content creators have
an interest in the content they create that the law should protect by
allowing content creators to exclude others from the content they create
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unless the content creator consents to its appropriation. The bundle of
powers, liberties, et cetera, of these rights surely resemble those of
material property rights but that does not imply that intellectual property
really is, as a conceptual matter, a property right. Again, it bears
emphasizing that the important issue is whether content creators have a
moral interest in the content they create that justifies legal protection that
allows them to exclude others. This is an issue that does not turn on
whether one calls it “property” or “shmoperty”; after all, information
privacy rights provide the legal power to exclude others from certain
information.
This Article attempts to provide the beginnings of a viable moral
justification for recognizing and providing legal protection of intellectual
property. The argument follows a line of arguments that is fairly
characterized as “inspired” by John Locke’s attempt to justify legal
protection of what he took to be a natural,1 objective,2 moral right3 to
material property.4 That is to say, it is Lockean in spirit in the following
sense: Locke grounds his argument for original acquisition in the idea
that a person is justified in acquiring something from the commons in
virtue of an investment he makes of something that is, in some sense,
“his.” In the Lockean case of original acquisition, the relevant investment
is a person’s expenditure of labor.
The argument of this Article should be considered as something of a
sketch for a couple of reasons. First, the issues of whether persons have
1. By natural, Locke means that these “rights” exist even in the state of nature.
A person has a natural right to P in virtue of having a certain moral status—and not in
virtue of being granted it by a social group. For example, a moral right to life would be
natural in the sense of being held by someone in virtue of her moral status as a person.
Even states must respect natural rights.
2. By objective, I mean that the existence and contents of these rights are not
social constructs. They might be filtered to the social categories of language, but
whether one has an intellectual property right to P is determined by mind-independent
considerations. It is the hallmark of objectivity that everyone could be mistaken in
believing a claim purporting to be objectively true. For example, nearly everyone
believed the earth was flat at one point in history. Even if everyone had thought this, the
idea that the earth is flat was simply false. The truth-value of the shape of the earth is
not determined by what people believe or think about it.
3. Moral right has become a term of art in copyright law referring to a specific
set of rights that authors retain in their content. I do not mean the term in this sense. By
moral right in this Article, I mean a right that is conferred by morality, rather than one
that is conferred by some social group, such as a club or the legal system. I am indebted
to Justin Hughes for this point.
4. See generally JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT (Thomas
P. Peardon ed., The Liberal Arts Press 1952) (1690).
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a morally protected interest in the content they create and, if so, whether
those morally protected interests should be protected by law are remarkably
complicated issues that have generated tens of thousands of pages of
argument. It would be naïve to think, and disingenuous to claim, that the
argument in this Article addresses all the relevant issues at a sufficiently
high level of depth and breadth to succeed in providing anything more
than plausible beginnings of answers to these questions—answers that
build upon the work of other theorists but are grounded in different
interests than those grounding legal rights to intellectual property in
these other works.
Second, the thesis is a highly general one: the thesis is merely that
there are morally protected interests in intellectual property that should,
as a matter of political morality, be protected by law. The thesis and
supporting arguments, although pointing in the direction of the claim
that the proper form of legal protection is a legal right, say nothing as to
the specific shape or content of the protections afforded to this legal right.
At most, on the influential Dworkinian assumption that the infringement
of a right cannot be justified by the desirable consequences of doing so,
the thesis entails that, absent exceptional circumstances, the legal right to
intellectual property cannot be defeated by just the desirable consequences
of doing so. Only an unjustified infringement of a right, as I use the term,
constitutes a violation; justified infringements do not violate the right.
Accordingly, it is important to distinguish the general issue of whether
intellectual property is justified from the more specific issue of whether
a particular body of intellectual property law (for example, copyright
law in the United States) is justified. Obviously, a particular body of
law protecting intellectual property will not be justified if intellectual
property protection is, as a general matter, unjustified, but the converse
is not true. One can reasonably believe that content creators have
intellectual property rights that should be protected by law but believe
also that many elements of existing copyright and patent law in Western
nations are unjustified. The arguments in this Article are concerned
primarily with the general issue and not with the more specific issue of
whether the law of intellectual property in Western industrialized nations
is morally legitimate, although some of the more problematic features of
existing law will be discussed briefly at the end of this Article.
Of course, at some point, any theory that purports to show that as a
general matter, some legal protection of intellectual property is morally
justified will have to engage the more specific normative issues regarding
what the content of those protections should be. But these arguments
will have to proceed on a case-by-case basis depending on whether the
content of any proposed legal norm coheres with the considerations that
purport to justify the general claim that some legal protection of intellectual
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property is justified. Addressing these latter issues will frequently be
difficult for two reasons. First, depending on one’s general moral
commitments, an adequate analysis might require comparing the moral
importance of interests among persons to determine whether some of
these interests rise to the level of rights that can be defeated only by
weightier rights. Second, addressing these issues might require very
difficult empirical analyses that seek to determine which acts best maximize
happiness or well-being in the community as a whole. In any event, the
difficulties involved in evaluating the various provisions of existing
copyright law are sufficiently nuanced and challenging, whatever moral
theory is assumed, that I cannot claim to have done anything more than
to have offered the beginnings of what I hope will turn out in the end to
be a plausible Lockean justification for legal protection of intellectual
property rights. It is for this reason that the title of the Article is Toward
a Lockean Moral Justification of Legal Protection of Intellectual Property.
II. TWO APPROACHES TO GENERAL MORAL THEORIZING
Normative moral theories that attempt to identify moral principles that
determine which acts are morally obligatory, prohibited, and permissible
are usually divided into two categories: consequentialist and deontological
moral theories.5 Although there are a number of different ways to define
the two types of theory, they are usually defined in such a way as to
mutually exclude one another and to jointly exhaust the possible classes
of moral theory. Consequentialist theories, on the one hand, claim that
the only relevant feature in evaluating an act from the standpoint of
morality is to determine whether the effects promote some favored value
in the community. Deontological theories, on the other hand, simply deny
that the consequences of some favored state of affairs are the only
relevant features in evaluating the act; sometimes the intrinsic character
of an act determines, at least in part, its moral quality. I take the time
here to set forth the essentials of the views because it seems to me that
the two views are frequently misunderstood in the literature on
intellectual properties.

5. There are moral theories that are concerned with assessing character traits and
hence the person, such as virtue theory. Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics is, of course, the
classic work. See generally ARISTOTLE, ARTISTOTLE’S NICOMACHEAN ETHICS (Robert C.
Bartlett & Susan D. Collins trans., 2011) (c. 384 B.C.E.).
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A. Consequentialist Theories
Pure or act-consequentialist theories of morality are “reductive” in the
sense that they attempt to ground all particular correct moral judgments
about acts in one foundational moral principle that takes the promotion
of one particular state of affairs as the sole measure of what is objectively
morally good. Different act-consequentialist theories disagree on what state
of affairs is the sole objective measure of moral goodness or wrongness, but
the point is that, according to act-consequentialist moral theories, the
only relevant index of moral quality of an act is its consequences in
promoting the favored objective state of affairs.
One example of such a theory is act-utilitarianism, according to which
an act is morally good or bad only to the extent that it increases or decreases
utility in the community. Different theorists define utility differently.
Utility has variously been defined, inter alia, as “pleasure,” “happiness,”
“subjective well-being,” “objective well-being,” and “satisfied preferences.”
It is absolutely crucial to note here that the only thing that matters with
respect to morally evaluating an act is the consequences of the act on
utility, however defined. Intentions and other mental states might bear
on judgments of culpability; however, they have no relevance with respect
to evaluating the moral quality of an act. Consequences, and only
consequences, matter with respect to such moral judgments. Thus, one
could commit a morally wrong act without being culpable for it, depending
on one’s mental state, including intentions, knowledge, et cetera.
It is equally critical to understand that a popular formulation is false.
Act-utilitarian and act-consequentialist theories do not require “the
greatest good for the greatest number.” There is not, and could not be, a
distribution requirement that coheres with a basic assumption of all such
theories. The assumption is that no one person’s utility, however defined,
counts more than any other’s. Assuming for the moment the implausible
claim that the various measures of utility could be accurately quantified,
one “util” of utility in one person is equal to one util in any other person.
Unlike other theories, a person may not count her own utility for more
than any other person’s in deliberating on the issue of what to do. Any
distribution requirement would be inconsistent with this basic assumption as
it would require privileging some set of persons’ utility more than others.
The one exception might be: if there are two distributions that maximize
utility, one can choose one on other grounds—perhaps to provide the
greatest good for the greatest number.
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B. Deontological Theories
Deontological theories reject the idea that the moral quality of an act
is entirely determined by its consequences. According to deontological
theories, the moral quality of some acts is determined, in part, by intrinsic or
inherent features of the act. For example, one might say lying is wrong, not
just because it hurts people, but because it is inherently deceptive and,
for that reason, intrinsically wrong.
Indeed, it is important in understanding the difference between the two
kinds of theory to realize that deontological theories are typically defined
in terms of rejecting the consequentialist claim that the consequences of
an act on producing the favored state of affairs is the only factor of
relevance in assessing it from the standpoint of morality:
In contrast to consequentialist theories, deontological theories judge the
morality of choices by criteria different than the states of affairs those choices
bring about. Roughly speaking, deontologists of all stripes hold that some
choices cannot be justified by their effects—that no matter how morally good
their consequences, some choices are morally forbidden.6

Thus, the theoretical condition that must be satisfied to be properly
characterized as a deontological theory is quite weak: there is at least
one act A such that A’s moral value is at least partly determined by
something other than the consequences of A on some favored state of
affairs.
This is theoretically important because it is sometimes thought that
any reference to consequences in determining the moral quality of an act
is logically inconsistent with a deontological approach. This view is false,
as is shown by the italicized portion of the above quote. This portion
states that “some choices cannot be justified by their effects”; it does not
state that no choice can be justified by its effects. A deontologist can take
consequences into account in a number of ways without any inconsistency,
including identifying the limits of some particular right.
This should not be surprising. After all, it is difficult to think of any
rights that are absolutely unqualified by some limits. As supporters of
the death penalty believe, the right to life is qualified by the moral
permissibility of capital punishment in response to murder. The
constitutional right to free speech, which presumably is understood to
6. Larry Alexander & Michael Moore, Deontological Ethics, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA
PHIL. (Nov. 21, 2007), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-deontological/ (emphasis
added).
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reflect the content of the moral right to free speech, is limited by certain
exceptions having to do with consequences, such as speech likely to
incite a riot or a fight. As will be seen below, I do something very much
like this, from a deontological starting point, in weighing the various
interests of persons in content created by someone else—and it should
not be thought problematic.
Some deontological theorists have taken the very strong view that
consequences are never relevant in evaluating the morality of an act.
For example, Immanuel Kant took the position that consequences are
never relevant in assessing the moral quality of an act because the
consequences of an act are always beyond our direct volitional control.7
If, for example, two people shoot simultaneously at a third person such
that each bullet will kill the latter, and one bullet hits the target while the
other hits a bird that has flown into the path of the bullet, which is
deflected harmlessly—except for the bird—to the ground, Kant claims
they are both equally culpable and equally deserving of punishment.8
On Kant’s view, only those factors that are completely within our
control can determine the moral value of an act; the moral worth of an
act cannot turn on luck. Thus, according to Kant, extrinsic features of an
act—like its consequences—are utterly irrelevant in determining its
moral worth because such features are beyond the direct volitional
control of the agent. In essence, then, these features turn on “luck.”
Kant believes that the moral value of an act is determined by two
characteristics: (1) the mental state of the agent that is involved in the
performance of the act; and (2) the intrinsic character of the act itself.
To have positive moral worth, an agent must perform an intrinsically
right act for the right reason. Thus, Kant rejects consequentialism for a
deontological approach that takes the position that the moral quality of
an act is determined entirely by features over which agents have complete
control: the intrinsically right thing for the right reasons.9
Although Kant takes the very strong view that consequences are
utterly irrelevant, other deontological approaches, including the one
taken in this Article, are compatible with the claim that consequences
sometimes determine the moral worth of an act. This Article does not
assume any particular deontological theory, which I take to be a merit of
7. See IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 10
(Allen W. Wood ed. & trans., Yale Univ. Press 2002) (1785).
8. This problematizes the common legal practice of punishing successful attempts
more severely than unsuccessful attempts.
9. It is worth noting that, partly in consequence, Kant seems to believe that all
rights and obligations are absolute in the sense that there are no exceptions or
qualifications. See IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDING FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS
63–67 (James W. Ellington trans., Hackett Publ’g Co. 3d ed. 1993) (1785).
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the Article since all theories have their critics. It simply makes an
assumption that all deontological theories share: the assumption is that
persons, as a conceptual matter, have certain interests that are protected
by morality, such as in the preservations of their own lives, in virtue of
falling under the moral category of personhood.10 In some cases, this
rises to the level of a moral right, but not in all. Regardless of which
particular deontological theory is true, all are committed to this view.
Thus, no contentious views are assumed—an advantage of the analysis.
Further, the weaker form of deontological theory applied in this
Article reflects commonsense conceptions of morality. Most of us, for
example, regard some behaviors as wrong in virtue of inherent essential
features. Killing an innocent person is wrong regardless of whether it
makes people happy or increases their well-being. The view here is that
killing an innocent person violates a moral right to life. However, most
of us also believe that the consequences of an act sometimes make it
morally wrong or morally good. For example, no one person can claim
a right to charity. But giving to someone who needs help is good, at
least in part, because of the favorable consequences on well-being. The
weaker form of deontological theory incorporates the common views
that (1) sometimes, but not always, the intrinsic quality of an act entirely
determines the moral worth of an act, and (2) consequences on human
well-being or happiness determine the moral worth of an act on those
occasions where its intrinsic quality is not morally relevant; the effects
on human happiness and well-being then are morally relevant. That
these views reflect how most people seem to think about moral judgments
is a merit of the weaker deontological theory.
However, it is also important to note that the deontological view that I
adopt is not as strong in a second important respect as Kant’s in
discounting the weight of consequences in determining the moral status
of an act. On my view, consequences will be relevant in limiting the
scope of a right and in weighing the various interests that people have
relative to the interests of the author in some piece of content. For
example, in weighing possibilities, satisfying a basic need, other things
being equal, will be morally preferable to satisfying a mere want for
content. So the scope of whatever morally protected interest authors
have in the contents they create will be weighed against the promotion of

10. In contrast, human being is a biological descriptive category that expresses no
value and hence has no normative implications.
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satisfied needs, wants, or preferences. There is nothing illicit in this
approach. As I remarked above, the criteria for being a deontological
theory are not as stringent as the criteria for being a consequentialist
theory: nothing but consequences are relevant for the latter, but the former
includes rights, intrinsic value, and consequences as morally relevant
considerations. Although one should explain how it is that consequences
qualify the scope of rights, this is not a theoretical task that must be
accomplished in this Article.
C. Special Difficulties in Supporting Consequentialist and
Deontological Arguments Regarding Intellectual
Property Rights
It is important to be aware that the differences between the contents of
the two theories entail different methodologies for supporting
consequentialist and deontological arguments. The consequentialist
considerations frequently adduced in support of claims regarding the
legitimacy of intellectual property protection tend to be more general
and speculative than is desirable—for even the most general thesis. For
example, it is frequently claimed by consequentialists supporting intellectual
property protection that a material incentive is necessary to ensure the
continuing production of content that conduces to human well-being.
But although this claim might be plausible from the standpoint of ordinary
pretheoretic intuitions about the motivation to produce, the claim that
human well-being is better served by a state of affairs in which there is
such protection than a state of affairs in which there is no such protection is,
at least in part, an empirical claim that would require a detailed empirical
analysis that compares the effects on human well-being of providing
some legal protection of intellectual property with the effects on human
well-being of not providing that protection—an enterprise that is supremely
difficult at even the general level. Each individual proposal for a
specific protection would have to be evaluated by a comparison of the
effects of accepting and enforcing the proposed protection with the
effects of not accepting and enforcing the proposed protection.
The same is true with respect to consequentialist arguments rejecting
the legitimacy of intellectual property rights. These arguments typically
rely on claims that require empirical support. For example, one frequent
consequentialist argument against intellectual property rights is that they
stifle innovation that would conduce to the common good. Again,
although this is plausible from a pretheoretical intuitive point of view,
the only way to justify this claim is by providing an empirical analysis
that confirms the claim. Strictly speaking, consequentialist arguments
for and against the legal protection of intellectual property rights are
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empirical hypotheses that require sociological evidence that is lacking
in, at least, the consequentialist literature with which I am familiar.11
Part of the reason there is little if any compelling empirical sociological
evidence is that there is no obviously reliable frame of comparison that
would provide adequate empirical evidence. Industrial, affluent Western
nations typically provide legal protection of intellectual property in the
form of copyright law. In consequence, there are no societies close enough
in character to such nations as the United States that would provide a
reference point for comparison to sufficiently similar nations without
copyright law. Of course, the content of copyright law differs among
nations. Even so, it would be difficult to assess the comparative
consequences on well-being because it is hard to find an accurate index
of well-being that would provide a point of reference for sociological
study.12
There are a number of other considerations further complicating the
difficulty in assessing the legitimacy of intellectual property by applying
the utilitarian principle. First, it is difficult to see how we can make
accurate interpersonal comparisons of utility. Suppose, for example, you
and I really like dark chocolate. It is difficult to see how we could decide
which person gets more pleasure out of dark chocolate. One might think
that one’s externalized reactions would provide a reliable guide, but
externalized reactions are not necessarily reliable for at least two reasons:
(1) people can exaggerate their feelings when expressing them; and
(2) some people might have lower thresholds for how much pleasure
one must experience to induce an enthusiastic externalized response.

11. I am grateful to Mark Lemley for pointing out to me that the situation is a little
better for consequentialist analyses of the existing content of patent law. However, until
comparatively recently, there have been almost no empirical studies regarding the effects
of various provisions of copyright law on innovation. One exception is Michael A.
Carrier, Copyright and Innovation: The Untold Story, 2012 WIS. L. REV. 891. Although
more than welcome, this paper examines only one side of the issue—the extent to which
copyright law hinders innovation and presumably thereby diminishes well-being. For a
complete analysis from a consequentialist perspective, the extent to which copyright law
promotes well-being must be considered and balanced against the costs to well-being of
copyright law. So this is, at best, a modest first step in the correct direction.
12. This may be part of the reason that articles featuring empirical analysis, such
as discussed in note 11, are concerned with identifying only costs. Such an analysis can
proceed with a limited frame of reference—policies that have led businesses to make
decisions reducing productivity and innovation. But a full frame of reference is needed
to balance costs and benefits, and this is comparatively more difficult to identify.
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Second, there might be objective facts about what does and does not
conduce to human well-being, but it is obvious that a person’s subjective
tastes, preferences, and desires are sometimes relevant in determining
what conduces to that person’s well-being. For example, I detest the taste
of pungent cheeses (especially bleu cheese). Feeding one of these cheeses
to me when there are other food items I enjoy that provide the same
nutritional value would trigger a violently unpleasant gag reflex and
hence diminish my well-being. If so, the utilitarian would need to know
all the objective and subjective constituents of well-being.
Finally, it is not just that promotion of a person’s well-being has some
subjective determinants; promotion of well-being also has some
intersubjective determinants in the form of cultural conditioning. For
example, we are culturally conditioned to strongly reject consuming
dogs as food while people in other cultures are culturally conditioned to
view and consume dogs as food. Given that what promotes any person’s
well-being is determined partly by subjective and intersubjective
considerations, cross-cultural comparisons of the effects of intellectual
property law on well-being are, as far as we can tell, probably if not
inherently unreliable. This is not to say that they are as a matter of fact
unreliable; rather, it is to say only that we have no way of ascertaining
the extent to which cross-cultural comparisons of utility are reliable.
Deontological arguments face a different challenge: there is no algorithm
for discerning the content of moral principles on the assumption that
morality is deontological in character, rather than consequentialist. Moral
argument, from a deontological perspective, must rely on moral intuitions,
which might be incorrect or might not be sufficiently common to provide
the basis for a compelling argument. It is not surprising that the debate
on the legitimacy of legal protection of intellectual property continues
with nothing that commands a consensus. All arguments regarding
the legitimacy of intellectual property rights are subject to epistemological
limitations that ensure that they fall short of providing all the depth,
breadth, and nuance that would optimally be provided in support of
whatever position is taken. This is yet another reason I do not pretend to
have offered more than the beginnings of a potentially successful argument.
Accordingly, a seemingly somewhat less precise methodology must be
assumed for deciding moral issues under a weak deontological theory.
The argument of this Article relies on intuitive moral judgments that
most readers are assumed to share and indeed enjoy a privileged status in
moral belief structures. These particular intuitions are paradigmatic
judgments that are foundational in the sense that they define adequacy
conditions on theories that purport to justify the coercive authority of the
state. That is to say, readers will evaluate a general moral theory that
seeks to justify the state’s coercive authority partly by determining whether
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the theory harmonizes with these foundational intuitions. To put it in
terms associated with evaluating scientific theories, these intuitions function
in the minds of those who accept them as data points that any successful
theory of state legitimacy must capture and explain. Thus, if the reader
does not share these moral intuitions, then the reader will not find the
argument of this Article persuasive.
Although the methodology proposed here involves the messy process
of resorting to shared moral intuitions in order to identify and weigh
relevant morally protected interests against one another to see what
interests win out, it has one clear advantage. One reason for adopting
the methodology described above is precisely that weak deontological
theories incorporate a plurality of relevant considerations, including rights
and effects on well-being; it is not just that people tend, as a matter of
descriptive empirical fact, to reason about moral issues this way. Taken
together, these two considerations provide good reasons for adopting this
methodology.
In any event, however, the argument is deontological rather than
consequentialist in character insofar as it assumes that there are some
moral obligations that do not have their origin in the fact that they conduce
to promoting social benefits. These obligations have their origin, at least
in part, on the inherent character of the acts.
Not surprisingly, many notable moral and normative political theorists
have adopted this methodology—although there might be subtle differences
among the particulars of this general approach as adopted by different
moral and normative political theorists. For example, John Rawls is
well known for his version of the methodology, which he calls reflective
equilibrium, and which is succinctly and elegantly described by Norman
Daniels as follows:
The method of reflective equilibrium consists in working back and forth
among our considered judgments (some say our “intuitions”) about particular
instances or cases, the principles or rules that we believe govern them, and the
theoretical considerations that we believe bear on accepting these considered
judgments, principles, or rules, revising any of these elements wherever
necessary in order to achieve an acceptable coherence among them. The
method succeeds and we achieve reflective equilibrium when we arrive at an
acceptable coherence among these beliefs. An acceptable coherence requires
that our beliefs not only be consistent with each other (a weak requirement),
but that some of these beliefs provide support or provide a best explanation for
others. Moreover, in the process we may not only modify prior beliefs but add
new beliefs as well. There need be no assurance the reflective equilibrium is
stable—we may modify it as new elements arise in our thinking. In practical
contexts, this deliberation may help us come to a conclusion about what we
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ought to do when we had not at all been sure earlier. We arrive at an optimal
equilibrium when the component judgments, principles, and theories are ones
we are un-inclined to revise any further because together they have the highest
degree of acceptability or credibility for us. An alternative account retains the
importance of revisability and emphasizes the positive role of examining our
moral intuitions, but rejects the appeal to coherentism in favor [of] treating our
intuitive moral judgments as the right sort to count as foundational, even if
they are still defeasible.13

The idea here is that we start from ordinary moral judgments that are
assumed, rather than argued for, on the ground that they seem intuitively
plausible and possibly even self-evident in some cases. The argument
attempts to show that the conclusion best coheres with—and is possibly
entailed by—the moral judgments that are assumed as being shared.
A similar methodology has been adopted and defended by Bernard
Gert, which he calls the method of “common morality.”14 The point here is
to ground moral judgments and moral theories, as much as possible, in
the common morality, a widely shared set of particular moral judgments
on specific cases and general principles. Gert believes not only that this
is the right account of how to reason when evaluating actions from a
moral point of view but also that this is the way in which most people
reason when they seek to evaluate the morality of an act.15
It is worth reiterating one consequence of this methodology: if the
reader rejects one or more of the moral claims that are assumed rather
than argued for, the argument is unsuccessful in its principal aim, which
is to show readers that they hold certain assumptions that logically
commit them to a conclusion that they might have rejected prior to the
argument. This is a common argument strategy, and one of the reasons
that strategies like this are very common in political philosophy, applied
ethics, and normative legal philosophy is that one cannot give an argument
for every claim one makes in defending a conclusion. Attempting to do
so would require the ability to give arguments of infinite length.
D. Consequentialism, Deontology, and the U.S. Constitution
As is well known, the Constitution delegates the authority to Congress
to make copyright law for instrumentalist reasons. Section 8 of Article I
of the Constitution provides that “Congress Shall have the Power . . . To
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited

13. Norman Daniels, Reflective Equilibrium, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Jan. 12,
2011), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/reflective-equilibrium/ (citations omitted).
14. See generally BERNARD GERT, COMMON MORALITY: DECIDING WHAT TO DO
(2004).
15. See id. at 4.

1118

[VOL. 49: 1105, 2012]

Legal Protection of Intellectual Property
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries.”16
Nevertheless, it is important to realize that there is no assumption in
the Constitution that any consequentialist theory is true. First, although
this provision grants Congress the power to protect copyright for reasons
having to do with the consequences and social benefits, the Constitution,
strictly speaking, provides the legal justification for protecting copyright.
It does not so much as even purport to provide a moral justification.
There is a good reason for this, although this might not have been part
of the thinking of the Framers. The claims that the Constitution delegates
the authority to Congress does not and cannot constitute a foundational
justification because it must be shown, not merely assumed, that the
system of law established by the Constitution is justified by political
morality and is therefore morally legitimate. It might be that the particular
form of democracy that is established by the Constitution, along with the
enumerated powers of the federal legislature, is illegitimate in some
respects. Although this might seem obviously implausible, our sense of
what is obviously or self-evidently true has frequently been mistaken.17
It is for this reason that an argument is needed, and there have been
many articles addressing the legitimacy of constitutional democracy.
Indeed, it might turn out that intellectual property rights do not have
the social benefits the Framers of the Constitution assumed they would
have. Given the stated constitutional purpose of copyright law, Congress
would lack authority to protect these “rights.” Even so, intellectual
property rights might be morally justified by other considerations that
have nothing to do with the social benefits. Many legal theorists argue
legal intellectual property rights are morally legitimate in virtue of some
inherent natural moral right each person has to “own” his or her writings
and discoveries. The Constitution is a legal document that sets up the
mechanisms and institutions of a system of law that claims a limited
monopoly on force and enforces valid enactments with coercive mechanisms.
For this reason, the very system of law that the Constitution defines is in
need of the foundational moral justification. It cannot, so to speak, pull
itself up by its own bootstraps.
16. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
17. For example, Euclid’s Parallel Postulate was regarded as self-evident for many
years until it was learned that Einstein’s theory of relativity presupposed non-Euclidean
geometry. Instead of there being one line passing through a point parallel to a given line
off that point, Einstein’s theory of relativity presupposes an infinite number.
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It might be that the foundational principle that can be adduced as a
moral justification for legitimate coercive state authority is a
consequentialist principle. Insofar as this is true, it is true that the legal
order defined by the Constitution is morally justified in virtue of its effects
on social utility. Further, on this assumption, it would also be true that
the legitimizing purpose of intellectual property law is to maximize social
benefits. Hence, it is in line with the Constitution’s stated purpose for
assigning power to Congress to protect intellectual property rights and
accords with the foundational moral principles that justify the use, by a
state with a Constitution like ours, of coercive mechanisms to enforce valid
legal norms, including ones protecting intellectual property interests of
authors and creators. But, again, this is not something that can be simply
assumed, as consequentialist moral theories are contested in the
philosophical literature and vulnerable to many objections.
Moreover, other provisions of the Constitution are incompatible with a
reductionist moral theory of act-consequentialism. The enumeration of
rights in the Bill of Rights is inconsistent with act-consequentialist theories
because the latter says that the only relevant consideration in evaluating
the normative correctness of an act is the consequences of the act in
promoting the relevant objective measure of good. But rights, according
to both conceptual considerations and according to the relevant
constitutional jurisprudence, cannot justifiably be infringed by the social
benefits or desirable consequences of doing so; as Ronald Dworkin
famously puts it, rights “trump” consequences in the sense that the
infringement of a right can be justified only to secure the satisfaction of
a more important right.18 Indeed, the very existence of a moral right
seems logically inconsistent with moral act-consequentialism because
the desirable consequences of infringing a right can never justify
violating it—and there are no other relevant factors, according to actconsequentialism, in evaluating an act than the consequences.
It is commonplace that act-utilitarianism is vulnerable to a host of
counterexamples where the correct outcome under an act-utilitarian analysis
permits the killing of an innocent person to maximize utility. Here is
just one of many such examples:
Another problem for utilitarianism is that it seems to overlook justice and
rights. One common illustration is called Transplant. Imagine that each of
five patients in a hospital will die without an organ transplant. The patient in
Room 1 needs a heart, the patient in Room 2 needs a liver, the patient in Room
3 needs a kidney, and so on. The person in Room 6 is in the hospital for
routine tests. Luckily (for them, not for him!), his tissue is compatible with the
other five patients, and a specialist is available to transplant his organs into the

18.
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other five. This operation would save their lives, while killing the “donor”.
There is no other way to save any of the other five patients.19

What causes the problem here is that the only morally salient factor in
evaluating an act is its tendency to promote the favored consequences.
When an agent decides how to act, no one’s interests or utility count for
more than another person’s, and this is simply logically incompatible
with there being moral rights. In the example above, it is permissible to
kill the person in Room 6 because he has no right to life that would
trump the effects on utility.
Finally, constitutional jurisprudence treats the fundamental rights
granted by the Amendments in a way that is inconsistent with actconsequentialism. The strict scrutiny standard, by its own terms, allows
the infringement of a right only if it is necessary and hence the only way
to achieve a compelling state interest; this states a test that is
fundamentally different from a test that makes the weighing of desirable
and undesirable consequences the only relevant factor in ascertaining the
permissibility of an act.
On the assumption that a general moral theory is implicit in the text of
the Constitution, that theory simply could not be an act-consequentialist
one. Other considerations than consequences are relevant in assessing
the constitutionality of a legislative act, and that makes any moral theory
presupposed by the Constitution, if there is one, a deontological theory.
III. TWO MORAL ISSUES CONCERNING THE JUSTIFICATION OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
It is important to note that there are two ethical issues regarding
intellectual property not clearly distinguished in the literature. The first
is whether authors have a morally significant interest—one that receives
some protection from morality—in controlling the disposition of the
contents of their creations, which would include some possibly limited
authority to exclude others from appropriating those contents subject to
payment of an agreed-upon fee; this interest might, or might not, rise to
the level of a moral right. The second is whether it is morally permissible
for the state to use its coercive power to protect whatever such interests
authors might have in the contents of their creations.

19. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Consequentialism, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL.
(Sept. 27, 2011), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consequentialism/ (citations omitted).
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These two issues are logically distinct. The first is an issue
concerning moral standards that apply to the acts of individuals, while
the second is an issue concerning moral standards that apply to the acts
of governmental entities. Not every morally protected interest an
individual has is legitimately protected by the state. For example, I have
a morally protected interest in not being told lies, but it would not be
legitimate for the state to create a criminal or civil cause of action that
makes people liable for any or every lie they tell.20 Conversely, not
every morally legitimate law protects some interest that is antecedently
protected by morality. Apart from the existence of a law requiring people to
drive, say, on the left-hand side of the road, no one has a morally
protected expectation that people drive on the left-hand side of the road.
Such an interest arises only after the enactment of a law requiring as
much—and it arises because that law has been enacted.21 What individuals
morally ought to do and what the law morally ought to do are issues that
fall into two different areas of normative ethical theorizing.
This is not to say that the two issues are utterly unconnected. It seems
reasonable to think that there are a number of legitimizing purposes of
law. Arguably, one of them is to protect moral rights, such as the right
to life. The moral importance of this right seems a sufficient justification to
use the coercive mechanisms of law to protect it. This is not, however,
to say that one of the legitimizing purposes of the state is to enforce all
moral rules. As mentioned above, it would be illegitimate for the state
to enforce laws prohibiting all lying.
Abortion presents an interesting example where the individual and
political ethical issues are related in arriving at a position on whether
abortion rights should be legally protected. The abortion rights opponent
typically puts a moral principle governing individual behavior together
with a moral principle governing the law to produce the conclusion that
abortion should be criminalized. The moral principle governing individual
acts is that to perform an abortion at any stage in the pregnancy is to
commit murder—the morally wrongful intentional killing of a person.
The moral principle governing state behavior is something like: any
legitimate state should criminalize any act that is properly characterized
as murder. Thus, the abortion rights opponent concludes that abortion
should, as a matter of political morality, be criminalized. In contrast, the
20. Certainly, this has been presupposed in some Supreme Court decisions. Most
recently, United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2547–48 (2012), invalidated the Stolen
Valor Act, which criminalized lying about one’s service record under certain conditions.
21. This is not to say that every law creates morally protected interests, much less
moral obligations. There are some laws so evil that they utterly fail to create moral
interests or obligations. But some laws, like certain traffic laws that properly regulate
the flow of traffic to make it safe, clearly do create such interests.
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abortion rights proponent denies the moral principle that to perform an
abortion at any stage in the pregnancy is to commit murder, relying on
the denial of early fetal personhood, which is another moral claim.
Further, the abortion rights proponent argues that the privacy interests of
the mother that are legitimately protected by the state, as a matter of
political morality, include the right to abortion in the early stages of
pregnancy.22
But there are presumably other legitimizing purposes, such as to promote
the public good. It is widely accepted, if not adequately theorized, that
people have a moral right to material property that should be protected
by the state. But this does not imply that the state should afford absolute
protection to the right to property. The state may be morally justified in
coercively taxing people for the express purpose of redistributing income
from affluent to less affluent persons. In this case, the legitimizing purpose
of promoting the public good qualifies the state’s legitimate purpose of
protecting material property rights. It is simply a mistake to think that
the only legitimate purpose of the state is to coercively enforce norms
that protect morally significant interests. This is a point that bears
emphasizing because it will become important later on in the analysis.
At the risk of belaboring the point, the moral principles governing
individuals and those governing the state are quite different. The moral
principles governing the state are largely concerned with the issue of
whether and when the state is justified in using force to ensure compliance
with the law—“the problem of state legitimacy.” At the most basic
level, the problem of state legitimacy arises because the state’s use of
coercive enforcement mechanisms presumptively violates a person’s
right to autonomy—the qualified right to make and execute decisions
about what goals to pursue and how to go about pursuing them. Indeed,
it is precisely because people are presumed to have moral autonomy
rights that the problem of legitimate state authority arises.
Here it is helpful to note that the state’s use of coercion bears some
resemblance to a robber who threatens to harm or kill a person if the

22. Murderers of abortion providers have offered some chillingly plausible
reasoning defending their acts. The reasoning proceeds as follows: (1) A person with a
right to life begins at conception; (2) Killing an innocent person is murder; (3) Fetuses
are innocent persons; (4) Abortion kills fetuses; (5) Therefore, abortion is murder; (6) It
is morally permissible to use deadly force when necessary to defend the lives of innocent
persons; and (7) Therefore, it is morally permissible to use deadly force to prevent
abortions.
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victim does not hand over his or her money. The robber is clearly violating
moral autonomy rights but it is commonly assumed that at least some
states are morally justified in doing so. The question, however, is why
these states are permitted by morality to do what no one else may do.
How is any state different, from the standpoint of morality, from the
robber? That is, assuming some states are legitimate23 in being morally
justified in doing so, what properties or practices explain why the state
may do so? Why is it morally legitimate for the state to significantly
infringe upon autonomy rights when no one else may?
In fact, the state’s behavior seems worse than the behavior of a robber
in a number of respects. First, the transaction with the robber is transient:
the robber simply demands that you do something at a particular
moment in time. In contrast, the state demands that you do as it directs
for as long as you are within the confines of its boundaries. Second, a
robber typically demands just one kind of act—whether it is to hand over
your money or something else of value. The demands of the state, however,
cover a large range of behaviors. The state not only enacts laws restricting
violence but also frequently enacts laws that restrict sexual behavior,
having criminalized at various times masturbation and sexual activity that
involves oral-genital contact. In comparison, the robber seems far less
presumptuous in infringing upon one’s autonomy. It is because
philosophical anarchism—the position that the use of coercion is never
morally justified as a means of inducing certain acts—seems plausible,
given that morality seems to afford a presumptive autonomy right to be
free of coercive interference, that any body of law stands in need of a
foundational justification in political morality. In particular, any legal
protection of intellectual property is in need of such a justification.
In what follows, I argue (1) that as a matter of individual ethics, people
have a morally protected interest in the content that they create that
(2) should as a matter of political morality receive legal protection in
certain cases. Thus, the argument will consist, as it should according to
the argument given above, of two planks: a plank that draws from
individual ethics and a plank that draws from political morality. Of course,
the reader should always bear in mind that moral claims are always

23. See generally JOSEPH RAZ, Authority, Law, and Morality, in ETHICS IN THE
PUBLIC DOMAIN: ESSAYS IN THE MORALITY OF LAW AND POLITICS 194 (1994), for a
discussion of the concept of legitimacy and the distinction between legitimacy and
legality. An authoritative directive is legitimate if the authority has a moral “right to
rule” that permits, from the standpoint of political morality, the state to coercively
enforce the law. Id. at 210. A normative directive has the property of legality if and
only if it is enacted in accordance with the grounds of law, as Dworkin put it, or with the
criteria of legality, as Hart might have said. See id. at 206–10, 214–16. The latter
simply expresses that the directive counts as law.
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contestable; the best that can be done here is to ground both pieces of the
argument in assumptions about morality the reader shares. There is
nothing unusual about this; this is standard operating procedure in applied
ethics and applied political morality.
IV. A TELLING SHORTCOMING WITH CONSEQUENCE-BASED
ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST THE MORAL
LEGITIMACY OF LEGAL PROTECTION OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
As noted above, the Constitution vests Congress with the authority to
enact copyright law to “promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,
by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”24 But, as also noted
above, the Constitution provides the legal foundation for vesting Congress
with this authority. But this is not the issue with which this Article is
concerned, again, because the moral legitimacy of such authority and the
resulting content of exercising this authority in the form of the existing
content of copyright law is, at best, assumed. This Article is concerned
with the more general issues of (1) whether persons have, as a matter of
individual ethics, a morally protected interest in the content they create,
which might or might not rise to the level of a moral right; and (2) whether
the state should, as a matter of political morality, protect these interests
with the coercive force of law. The second issue is a general moral issue
that does not address the precise contours any law protecting intellectual
property, if morally legitimate, should take. The moral legitimacy of a
particular body of law protecting intellectual property is obviously an
important issue, but it is an issue that depends in part on there being a
compelling reason to think that legal protection of intellectual property is
morally justified as a general matter.
It is worth noting that consequentialist arguments for or against legal
protection of intellectual property seem to fall short in one important
respect: none pays sufficient attention to the issue of whether authors
have some distinctive, morally protected interest in the contents of their
creations in virtue of the investment they make in producing that content.
Indeed, such arguments do not, in virtue of their very character, even
address the issue of whether content creators have a distinctive interest

24.

U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
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in the content they create that deserves legal protection, much less whether
people have different morally protected interests in the content created
by others that outweigh the morally protected interest, if any, that content
creators have in the content they create.
This is because the only factor that matters in consequence-based
arguments is whether legal protection of intellectual property maximally
conduces to the favored state of affairs, whether it be maximal happiness,
human well-being, pleasure, or satisfied preferences. That is, there is
only one variable of moral salience, and it is measured on the same scale
for every person; for this reason, no one person has distinctive interests that
receive special protection from morality. Moreover, since there is only
one such variable, no weighing of interests takes place; the changes in
the relevant variable for each person that result from some proposed act
are simply aggregated and compared to the aggregates of the other options.
The author’s investment of time, energy, or labor into the content the
author creates matters only insofar as it implicates the favored variable,
and the relevant interest on the part of the author counts for no more and
no less than those of other persons; one util of a positive move in the
variable for the author counts for no more than one util of a positive
move in the variable for any other person.
This seems intuitively problematic because the interests and value that
other people assign to the content are quite different from the interest
and value that authors assign to their content. My interest in someone
else’s music is just the enjoyment I will get listening, whereas it is unlikely
that the songwriter would value the content for just that reason even
assuming songwriters write music to enjoy listening to it.
That this is a flawed approach can be seen in thinking about whether,
as a general matter of political morality, the law should protect a person’s
interest in her life. If all that matters is whether the continuation of a
person’s life maximally conduces to some element of the common good,
then it would follow that it is morally permissible for a particular
person to be killed if it maximally conduces to the common good. No
consideration whatsoever would be given to whether people have a
morally protected interest in their lives that warrants legal protection.
Consequence-based arguments presuppose the interests of all persons in,
say, John Doe’s life are aggregated and assessed on the same scale.
Although in most cases John Doe’s interests will be such that protecting
his life conduces maximally to the relevant index of utility, there will be
some possible cases in which it does not. Some of these cases might
require killing him even though he has done nothing wrong.
This is why general consequentialist theories of morality command
progressively fewer defenders in philosophy than they once did. The
idea that no person has any morally protected interests that cannot
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justifiably be infringed because of the desirable consequences on the
lives of other persons seems radically implausible to contemporary
sensibilities, which increasingly emphasize the importance of moral
rights. Again, this might define the constitutional limits on Congress’s
authority to enact copyright law. But, to reiterate, this is a quite different
issue, which has to do with evaluating the constitutionality of the various
provisions of copyright law.
If people have distinctive moral interests in content, then a fully adequate
evaluation of whether intellectual property protection is justified will have
to be grounded in part in an analysis that does four things: (1) considers
whether authors have a morally protected interest in the content that they
create, discover, or otherwise make available in virtue of the investments
they make in creating content; (2) considers whether other persons have
a morally protected interest in that content; (3) weighs the respective
interests; and (4) provides reasons grounded in political morality that
justify legal protection of the weightier interests, which might require
law’s making access to content free for all persons. As we will see below,
many of the arguments in favor of intellectual property protection are
grounded in the view that authors have a moral right to control the
disposition of their intellectual creations. These arguments are discussed
and assessed in the following Parts. As we will see, these arguments tend
to share a different, albeit related, shortcoming.
V. ARGUMENTS FROM INVESTMENT
There are a number of “arguments from investment.” What these
arguments all have in common is the idea that content creators invest
something in which they have a strong morally protected interest,
possibly rising to the level of a moral right, into the creation of content
that should, as a matter of justice or fairness, be protected by a legal
right to intellectual property. Each of these arguments will be discussed
separately below.
A. The Classical Lockean Argument for Material Property Rights
It is instructive to begin with a brief look at the classical Lockean
argument for “original acquisition” of material property. Original
acquisition is the conversion of an object that no one owns into an object
that someone owns. Locke realized that the existence of a moral right to
property depends critically on the idea that persons can acquire a
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property right in objects to which no one else has a prior moral claim or
entitlement, which applies to objects that are not the property of anyone
else. As Locke expressed the problem: if God gave the material world to
all men to use in common to survive and thrive, how can someone
acquire a right to exclude others from appropriating a material resource
taken from the commons?25 Property rights, unlike other rights, permit a
person to appropriate something external to him and exclude others from
appropriating it, even if the former does not use it and others need it. To
put the problem of original acquisition another way: how can I take
something that is not my property and turn it into something that is my
property and allows me to exclude others?
Original acquisition is the core concern of theories justifying
material property rights. Transfer of something to which one has an
ownership claim is, in most cases, easily justified on the strength of
autonomy considerations; if I have an interest in something, then my
autonomy rights are such that I can abandon that interest unilaterally or
in exchange for payment of some amount. If, in contrast, no one is ever
justified in asserting ownership rights in something antecedently owned
by no one else, then no one could ever come to have an ownership right
in anything because every material entity has a history that can ultimately
be traced back to parts that were owned by no one—perhaps before
human beings arrived to appropriate those objects. The basic problem in
justifying the claim that there are moral rights to property of any kind is
showing that original acquisition is morally justified under certain
specified circumstances that harmonize with basic intuitions about fairness
and justice.26

25. LOCKE, supra note 4, at 16–17. According to Locke:
Whether we consider natural reason, which tells us that men, being once born,
have a right to their preservation, and consequently to meat and drink and such
other things as nature affords for their subsistence: or revelation, which gives
us an account of those grants God made of the world to Adam, and to Noah
and his sons; it is very clear that God, as King David says (Psalm cxv. 16),
“has given the earth to the children of men,” given it to mankind in common.
But this being supposed, it seems to some a very great difficulty how any one
should ever come to have a property in anything. I will not content myself to
answer that if it be difficult to make out property upon a supposition that God
gave the world to Adam and his posterity in common, it is impossible that any
man but one universal monarch should have any property upon a supposition
that God gave the world to Adam and his heirs in succession, exclusive of all
the rest of his posterity. But I shall endeavor to show how men might come to
have a property in several parts of that which God gave to mankind in
common, and that without any express compact of all the commoners.
Id. (quoting Psalms 115:16).
26. It should be recalled here that the methodology of this Article is the method of
reflective equilibrium, which relies heavily on basic intuitions on the relevant issue.
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Although this Article will not address this problem, it turns out that
what Robert Nozick called the “principle of justice in transfer” in his
libertarian theory of state legitimacy is somewhat more problematic than
commonly thought.27 Some problems described as being moral flaws in
the content of copyright law can, I think, more plausibly be conceived of
as caused by problems with a failure to properly frame and enforce
contract and antitrust law, which presumably attempt to incorporate, at
least in part, moral principles of justice in transfer. For example, the
recording industry is frequently criticized as exploitive of both musicians
and consumers. First, music prices are inflated beyond what would be
the equilibrium in a freely competitive marketplace because the industry
is controlled by something resembling an oligopoly. Second, royalties
to musicians are less than what they should be because musicians lack
the leverage to bargain at arm’s length because of the oligopolistic
character of the mainstream recording industry. Here the problem arises
because the oligopolistic character of the major labels affords them a
leverage to which the content creator has no answer. What strikes many
critics of copyright law as emblematic of what is wrong with existing
copyright law is, in large measure, a problem that arises because of
problematic market conditions and problematic contracts.
In any event, the argument of this Part of the Article should be considered
as exclusively concerned with “original acquisition,” so to speak, of
intellectual property, which amounts to original creation of novel content. It
is worth noting here that Locke’s argument for the existence of a natural
objective moral right to material property is concerned entirely with
original acquisition. Like most theorists, Locke seems to regard principles
of justice in transfer of material property as largely unproblematic.
Locke argues that one can acquire through the expenditure of one’s
labor a property right in material objects that are otherwise unowned:
Though the earth and all inferior creatures be common to all men, yet every
man has a property in his own person; this nobody has any right to but himself.
The labor of his body and the work of his hands, we may say, are properly his.
Whatsoever then he removes out of the state that nature has provided and left it
in, he has mixed his labor with, and joined to it something that is his own, and
thereby makes it his property. It being by him removed from the common
state nature placed it in, it has by this labor something annexed to it that
excludes the common right of other men.28

27.
28.

ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 179 (1974).
LOCKE, supra note 4, at 17.
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There are two provisos, according to Locke, that restrict original
acquisition: (1) there must be enough of the material object for everyone
else to appropriate; and (2) no one may acquire a material object to spoil
or destroy it. Presumably, the second proviso is intended to ensure that
one uses the material object or adds value to it.
According to this particular statement of the argument, then, one
acquires a property right in unowned material objects by investing one’s
property on the object in the form of one’s labor. There are a couple of
possible explanations for how laboring on an object might give rise to a
property right. First, it might be that one has mixed one’s labor and
hence one’s property into the object such that it cannot be retrieved; on
this view, putting my property into an object to which no one has any
prior property interests creates in me a property right to that object.
Second, it might be that one has, by one’s labor, improved that material
object thereby creating value that did not previously exist in the world;
on this view, it is only fair that I have the value that I have created by
investing my property into an object.
Either way, this argument does not clearly succeed in justifying
material property rights. The first question has to do with the idea that
we have property rights in our bodies and labor.29 First, and of little
consequence because contemporary Lockeans do not ground their theories
of property in any assumptions about God’s existence and nature, all
things, on a traditional Christian view, are God’s property, including
ourselves. We do not “belong to” ourselves; we belong to God, as God’s
property, suitably defined. Although Locke starts from a point of view
that is a theistic one, if not a Christian one, his first step out of the block
is inconsistent with these theological underpinnings. Strictly speaking,
we do not own ourselves from this point of view.30 There is a missing
moral premise in the argument.
Second, from a commonsense point of view, we simply do not conceive
of the relationship of ourselves to our bodies as one of ownership.
Although we naturally use the term my to refer to our bodies, we do not
29. One might think the inclusion of a premise that we own our bodies begs the
question of whether there are natural objective moral rights to material property. To
ground an argument for material property rights in a premise that presupposes that we
have property rights in our bodies, which are material objects, might seem to assume
what it seeks to prove. The problem with this objection is that Locke is concerned with
whether we can acquire property rights in material objects that are distinct from us, and
it is not clear that a person’s body is distinct from the person. I am indebted to Sam
Rickless for this observation.
30. Indeed, Locke’s position is in tension with the Christian doctrine he frequently
seems to presuppose. On one common view, we are holding our bodies in trust for God,
who is the sole owner of those bodies. I find it somewhat odd to think of human beings
as being divine property, but this seems a plausible view to many Christians.
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intend this pronoun in the same way that we use it in talking about other
objects. I am not my house, but I am my body. To characterize the
relationship between me and my body as one of ownership seems
misleading at best and confused at worst. Indeed, if A hits B and breaks
B’s nose, B will have many complaints: assault, injury, suffering, and so
on. But one complaint B does not seem to have, and one that would not
be actionable in any jurisdiction, is that A damaged B’s property when A
broke B’s nose.
Traditionally, what has been regarded as the most important problem
with the Lockean argument seems to be far less problematic when the
Lockean provisos are considered. To his credit, Robert Nozick, who
grounds his theory of property rights in the Lockean argument for
original acquisition, points out that one might plausibly think that we
simply forfeit the expenditure of our labor-property when we mix our
labor-property into some object that does not belong to us. If I swim out
to the middle of the Atlantic Ocean and somehow fence off a portion and
improve it by cleaning it of all pollution, most people will agree that I do
not thereby acquire a property right in that portion of the ocean. The
claim that I own my labor, even if true, does not imply that I own
whatever unowned object I mix it with.31
In any event, it is important to realize that Locke’s analysis did not
end here. At this point, all he has shown, at most, is that people have a
natural moral right to property—a conclusion grounded in principles of
individual ethics. In addition, he must provide reason to think that the
law should recognize and protect these rights. As will be recalled, the
analysis here is two-pronged.
Locke’s second prong is concerned with showing that a legitimate
state must protect these natural rights because we have these rights in
virtue of being moral persons. This job was done with his social contract
theory. This piece of Locke’s argument is concerned with showing that
we actually contract with one another to put ourselves under an obligation
31. As Robert Nozick puts the point:
But why isn’t mixing what I own with what I don’t own a way of losing what I
own rather than a way of gaining what I don’t? If I own a can of tomato juice
and spill it in the sea so that its molecules (made radioactive, so I can check
this) mingle evenly throughout the sea, do I thereby come to own the sea, or
have I foolishly dissipated my tomato juice?
NOZICK, supra note 27, at 174–75. For neo-Lockean responses to this point, see, for
example, A. JOHN SIMMONS, THE LOCKEAN THEORY OF RIGHTS 271–75 (1992), and
David Schmidtz, When Is Original Appropriation Required?, 73 MONIST 504 (1990).
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to obey the state as long as it respects natural moral rights and makes
law through democratic procedures.
One feature of Locke’s theory is crucial to note. Locke believes that
in the state of nature one has a moral right to defend oneself against
threatened violations of one’s moral rights to life, liberty, and property,
as well as a moral right to punish violations of those rights. As one of
the features of a legitimate state is a limited monopoly on the use of
force, Locke argues that it is part of the social contract that each party to
the contract give up her natural right to punish violations to the state.
Persons in a legitimate state can defend themselves against threatened
violations but they may not punish them; that is the exclusive province
of the state—a claim that I will rely on in what follows.
B. Applying the Lockean Approach to Intellectual Objects
It is important to note that both interpretations of Locke’s argument
for original acquisition of material property depend critically on the
assumption that we causally interact with preexisting material objects.
To “mix” one’s labor with some preexisting object is, at the very least,
to causally interact with that object. I can put my labor into a piece of
wood only because I can causally interact with the wood in the following
sense: my labor changes the form taken by the piece of wood. Likewise,
we can improve some material object only by changing it in a way that is
more easily appropriated for the satisfaction of human wants or needs. It
should be clear that we can change a material object only by causally
interacting with it.
Even if Locke’s argument were successful in justifying original
acquisition of material property, it does not have any direct or obvious
application to intellectual property because this assumption does not
apply to intellectual content. If it makes sense to think of intellectual
content as constituting objects that exist independently of us, they are
abstract objects with radically different properties than material or mental
objects—ideas, thought, perceptions, minds, et cetera. In contrast to
material objects, abstract objects, if there be such, lack extension, solidity,
and spatio-temporal location; it should be clear, for example, that the
object denoted by the symbol 2 is an entity of a very special kind: it is
intangible and neither here nor there. In contrast to mental objects,
abstract objects exist without being present to anyone’s consciousness.
It seems reasonable to think that the number denoted by 2 and the
proposition expressed by 2 + 2 = 4 exist in a world where there are no
minds to think about those objects; however, there are no ideas or other
mental states in a world where there are no minds.
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Of course, there are some difficult issues regarding the nature of certain
artistic content.32 It seems clear, for example, that a sculptor must causally
interact to mix labor with preexisting materials when she creates a
sculpture; sculptures are, after all, physical objects. Here it is helpful to
note that the sculptor has potentially two interests. One is in the physical
object that is the sculpture. But this is not the relevant interest from the
standpoint of intellectual property debates; there is no issue, after all,
about whether the sculptor can exclude people from appropriating the
physical object that is that particular sculpture. The relevant interest is
the sculptor’s interest in the “content” of that sculpture; her interest is
in protecting the content of that sculpture so that it cannot be reproduced
in some other material object.33 Although the ontological nature of this
content is not entirely clear, I am inclined to think that it is an abstract
object. Perhaps, it is something like the “form” that the sculpture has.
However, if the ontological character of sculptural content is not
entirely clear, it should be clear that much intellectual content has the
form of an abstract object. A set of propositions, such as is expressed by
a novel, constitutes an abstract object that contains as its members
abstract objects because both sets and propositions are abstract objects if
anything is an abstract object. Likewise, a string of linguistic symbols
(as opposed to their representations on a page) is an abstract object
containing abstract objects as members if, again, anything is an abstract
object. Accordingly, novels, plays, and other forms of intellectual content
that are linguistic in character are abstract objects.
What this means, it seems, is that we cannot causally interact with
such objects, assuming they exist in a genuine way and are not merely
theoretical posits. I can think about the abstract object denoted by 2 but
I cannot causally interact with that object in any way. I can express
some idea about 2 by means of the appropriate linguistic representation
and communicate that idea to you, but I do not seem to have any direct
causal access to that object; I cannot perceive 2 by any of the five senses,
nor is it plausible to think that I have a sixth sense made for “perceiving”
abstract objects. An abstract object might be important enough to warrant
the expenditure of a great deal of human energy, but that energy will not
be appropriately spent trying to causally interact with it. Reasoning about

32.
33.

I am indebted to Steve Layman for pointing this out to me.
At this point, no claim is being made about the legitimacy of this interest.
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an abstract object is the way in which we come to understand it and does
not involve causal interaction with such objects.34
It is not clear what Locke thought, if anything, about intellectual
property, but the foregoing analysis suggests that neither version of the
classical Lockean argument can be directly deployed to justify property
rights in, at the very least, intellectual objects that are linguistic in character,
such as novels, poems, et cetera. If I cannot causally interact with abstract
objects, then I can neither mix my labor with an abstract object nor use
my labor to create new value by improving some existing abstract
intellectual object. The Lockean argument, as he formulated it, would
have to be modified in some significant way to apply to these intellectual
objects. Further, if all intellectual content is abstract in character, as
seems eminently reasonable to me, the Lockean argument would have to
be modified to apply to any intellectual content whatsoever. As Locke
formulates the argument, it has no bearing on the issues of intellectual
property that currently divide us.
C. Learning from Locke: Contemporary Lockean Arguments for
Intellectual Property Protection
As we saw above, the original Lockean argument for material property
is not directly applicable to intellectual property because it relies on a
notion of mixing of labor that does not apply in circumstances in which
one does not, or in the case of intellectual property, cannot labor on a
preexisting object in the world, such as the creation of new content,
either because there is no preexisting object at all or because it is the
kind of object with which human beings cannot causally interact. The
Lockean argument must be modified to avoid reliance on this notion that
applies only to material property, if at all.
One way of doing this to avoid the problems that arise with the
original Lockean argument is to make a variation of a move that Locke
himself makes. At first the sole emphasis in the argument is that a moral
right to property in original acquisition is acquired by mixing one’s
property with an object and thereby having “fixed [one’s] property in
[it].”35 Then Locke begins to observe that labor “improves” the objects
in the world and adds value to it:

34. This is a standard view of abstract objects. See Gideon Rosen, Abstract Objects,
STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Mar. 6, 2012), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/abstract-objects/.
35. LOCKE, supra note 4, at 18 (“The labor that was mine, removing them out of
that common state they were in, has fixed my property in them.”).
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But the chief matter of property being now not the fruits of the earth and the
beasts that subsist on it, but the earth itself, as that which takes in and carries
with it all the rest, I think it is plain that property in that, too, is acquired as the
former. As much land as a man tills, plants, improves, cultivates, and can use
the product of, so much is his property. He by his labor does, as it were,
enclose it from the common. Nor will it invalidate his right to say everybody
else has an equal title to it, and therefore he cannot appropriate, he cannot
enclose, without the consent of all his fellow commoners—all mankind. God,
when he gave the world in common to all mankind, commanded man also to
labor, and the penury of his condition required it of him. God and his reason
commanded him to subdue the earth, i.e., improve it for the benefit of life, and
therein lay out something upon it that was his own, his labor. He that in
obedience to this command of God subdued, tilled, and sowed any part of it,
thereby annexed to it something that was his property, which another had no
title to, nor could without injury take from him.36

In Chapter V, Locke does not exploit what seems a plausible moral
principle that could form the basis for a second, more persuasive version
of the argument—the moral principle that when a person labors on an
object from the commons and creates new value in it, that person is
entitled, as a matter of both fairness and just desert, to the value he
creates and hence the object, as long as there is enough as good left for
everyone else.37 This, it seems, is a missed opportunity, as this seems to
be a true statement of a moral principle. It is so intuitively plausible,
indeed, that Locke should have dropped the claims about mixing labor
and made this argument.
When one substitutes the idea that the laborer creates the majority of
the value of an object in the commons for the mixing-labor idea, there is
a prima facie reason to think that she deserves, as a matter of fairness, to
keep that value. But putting this together with the idea that there is enough
of the resource, just as good in quality, for everyone else, strengthens the
argument. Now it is not just a matter of one person having a claim in an
object to which no one else has an antecedent claim, which would be
why it might seem fair that the laborer may keep the object. It is also a

36. Id. at 19–20.
37. One might object that one is entitled to only the value one creates and not the
object. There are a couple of responses to this. First, there is no way to extract the value
from the object, so to speak, and give the laborer just that value—other than in modern
times to pay someone the amount of the value added. Second, labor, on Locke’s view, is
responsible for nearly all the value in an object: 99/100, according to Locke. As Locke
puts it: “[I]f we will rightly estimate things as they come to our use and cast up the
several expenses about them, what in them is purely owing to nature, and what to labor,
we shall find that in most of them ninety-nine hundredths are wholly to be put on the
account of labor.” Id. at 25.
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matter of no one else being harmed by the appropriation. Strictly
speaking, the laborer’s acquisition of a property right takes nothing away
from anyone else that cannot easily be replaced. Each consideration
provides a good reason to think the laborer deserves a property right in
the object; it is hard to see how a plausible objection to the laborer’s
ownership could even get off the ground when the two ideas are put
together. It is not enough to ask the question; an argument is needed to
support the idea that the laborer gains no right to the object, and it must
be grounded in some plausible moral claim.
Nozick’s concern that someone who labors on a material object simply
loses his labor is directed at Locke’s idiosyncratic metaphysics of labor
and the equally idiosyncratic moral principle that must be assumed—that
a person acquires a property right in an unowned object by laboring on it
solely by virtue of having mixed his property into it. Less plausible is
the assumption that I lose any new value I have created by laboring on
an unowned object. It is reasonable to think that a person who fences off
a portion of the Atlantic Ocean and cleans it of pollution gains no property
right to it. But that arguably is because the laborer has not significantly
improved the value of any portion of the ocean that could be appropriated
without violating the Lockean proviso. To what fruitful use could that
portion of the ocean be put that improves on the uses to which it is currently
put? If one, on the other hand, fences off a sufficiently large portion to
violate the Lockean proviso and cleans it of pollution, then she has
certainly significantly added value in one sense. But in another she has
detracted from the value by reducing the amount of ocean available for
transporting people and goods, which is, of course, its most valuable use.
That reduction of value outweighs the value added by labor to amount to
an appropriation that spoils the resource, which would violate the other
Lockean proviso. So it appears that one would rightly lose one’s labor
because both provisos are violated and the relevant moral principle of
fairness is not satisfied.
In the context of making a Lockean-style argument for intellectual
property protection, the analogous move would be simply to argue that,
regardless of whether authors mix their labor with anything, they bring
new value into the world that was not available prior to the expenditure
of their labor. Since authors are responsible for the creation of this
value, it would be unfair not to allow them to define the terms upon
which others may take advantage of this value. They are responsible for
that value and hence deserve its full benefits. Moreover, if it makes
sense to think that there is enough left for others in the “intellectual
commons” or if there is nothing that would count as an intellectual
commons at all, then the argument for intellectual property protection
seems that much stronger.
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This is a particularly significant alteration of the original version of the
argument emphasizing the mixing of labor (and hence one’s property) with
the object. Even if there were some relevant sense in which one could
mix one’s labor with an object, the argument remains somewhat
unpersuasive because of its metaphysical character. This character requires
the argument to rely on a principle that does not seem sufficiently plausible
from the standpoint of ordinary moral intuitions to succeed. First, the
idea of mixing one’s property into an unowned object by laboring on it does
not obviously justify legal protection of the laborer’s property rights in part
because, without reliance on a premise that requires the creation of new
value through labor, the principle justifying original acquisition would
seem to be overbroad. There would be many cases of something more
appropriately characterized as “vandalism” that would incorrectly result
in gaining a property right over the vandalized unowned object. Second,
and as noted above, such a premise, because of its abstract premise, seems
to lack a firm foundation in moral rules governing fairness or justice.
Indeed, this is why Nozick’s concern about the labor-mixing metaphor
can be grounded in an example that seems clearly not to justify an instance
of original acquisition; merely mixing one’s property (in the example,
tomato juice) with an unowned object (in the example, a substantial portion
of the ocean) does not have any obvious normative implications.
What seems true of the Lockean argument for original acquisition of
material property also seems true of a Lockean-style argument for original
acquisition of intellectual property. Replacing the overly metaphorical
mixing-labor language with language involving the creation of new
value seems plausibly to fall within the area of morality defining standards
of fairness and desert. If I take an object in its natural state from the
commons and improve it to create new value in the world, it seems only
fair, other things being equal, that I receive the bundle of protections that
constitute a property right. Indeed, on the assumption that the relevant
Lockean proviso is satisfied with respect to that particular object,38 it
would seem intuitively unfair to deny the person who created the new
value. If I have created new value through my labor on an unowned
object and leave as much and as good for everyone else, it is very hard to
see how anyone might have even a weak prima facie moral claim that I
should not have a property right in the object. I created the new value

38.

An assumption that will be considered below.

1137

without depleting the amount of the relevant object that can be improved
or used by others.
Although some would reject this line of reasoning on the strength of
the now-familiar claim that no one person is fully responsible for the
content they create, this objection has little force. It might be true that
no author is solely responsible for the value introduced into the world by
a novel piece of content C because her ability to create C was shaped by
the efforts of others from whom she developed her skills and ideas, but
this claim cannot bear the weight of delegitimizing intellectual property
protection of the author’s interest. At most, it supports the conclusion
that the contributions of these other persons should be appropriately
compensated. It does not imply the stronger claim that every person should
have free access to content. This argument provides no reason to think
that someone who contributed nothing to the author’s ability to create
the relevant piece of content C should be able to access C without
compensating someone or that the author should not be able to exclude
such a person from appropriating C without paying the author a fee. The
fact that others contributed value to C does not imply that, for example,
I should get that content for free.
Moreover, this response concedes too much. As Adam Moore points
out, one can argue that the contributions of those who have contributed
to the author’s ability to create C have been fairly compensated through
a variety of social mechanisms.39 Education, after all, is not free. It
requires the payment by someone, possibly taxpayers, of tuition and
teacher salaries, as well as the purchase of books and textbooks. It seems
reasonable to think that such payments represent fair compensation for
the contributions made by such persons to the author’s ability to create
C. As Moore puts this important point, “When a parent pays, through
fees or taxation, for a child’s education it would seem that the
information—part of society’s common pool of knowledge—has been
fairly purchased.”40 Accordingly, if the argument that it is only fair that
authors be granted a legal right to exclusive control of the contents they
create is flawed, it is not because such a right would be inconsistent with
any rights of people who made indirect contributions to those contents
through other works that influenced the authors.
But beyond this, one can argue that the state’s legitimizing purpose of
promoting the public good might simply require the state to treat new
content as though the entire value of the content were created by the
author. It bears reiterating that there are likely multiple legitimizing
39. See ADAM D. MOORE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INFORMATION CONTROL:
PHILOSOPHIC FOUNDATIONS AND CONTEMPORARY ISSUES 172–73 (2001).
40. Id.
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purposes of the state that might conflict, and sometimes the legitimizing
purpose of promoting the public good will outweigh the legitimizing
purpose of protecting moral rights.
Another way of avoiding reliance on some sort of labor-mixing idea is
to focus exclusively on the author’s effort. Michael McFarland, for example,
argues as follows:
It takes much thought, time and effort to create a book, a musical composition,
or a computer program. Those who worked to create it have the strongest
claim to the benefits of its use, over anyone else who contributed nothing to
the project.41

It is important to note here that McFarland’s argument does not rely,
either explicitly or implicitly, on the premise that authors create content
by mixing their labor with some preexisting object. The claim is simply
one of justice: someone who invests significant effort has a superior
claim than anyone else to the content.
This particular modification of the Lockean argument is helpful but
less so than the first because it falsely assumes that authors necessarily
invest a great deal of something, whether thought, time, or effort, into
their creations. Although it is presumably true that one must invest
“much” thought, time, and effort into making a film like Pearl Harbor,
this is not true of all content creation. With proper inspiration, a poem
or a song might be created in a matter of minutes with little thought or
effort. If one must exert oneself to some threshold extent to gain a claim
in the product of one’s exertion, then this will have to be determined on
a case-by-case basis with the outcome being that not every author will
gain an intellectual property right. This, of course, might in the end turn
out to be correct, but McFarland’s version of the argument, like the other
investment arguments, is intended to justify a general right to intellectual
property. Still, how much work one expends in creating a novel piece of
creative content is a variable that helps to determine the value of the
investment—if not the value of the content, which is determined, and
rightly so, by a free market.
Accordingly, it is crucial to note that McFarland’s argument does
succeed at a more general level insofar as it adds another morally relevant
consideration to the mix—that the author must invest something of value

41. Michael C. McFarland, Intellectual Property, Information, and the Common
Good, B.C. INTELL. PROP. & TECH. F. (June 4–5, 1999), http://www.bc.edu/bc_org/avp
/law/st_org/iptf/commentary/content/1999060503.html.
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in order to create new value in the object. Although McFarland does not
take into account the other features adduced above, it is instructive to see
how they function together to strengthen the case for original acquisition.
Notice that it is not just that the laborer created new value in an unowned
object that explains the claim of the laborer to a protected property right
to the object. It is rather that the laborer has invested something of value
in order to create this new value. Insofar as the Lockean proviso is satisfied,
it seems quite reasonable, from the standpoint of widely accepted moral
intuitions, to think that it would be unfair not to recognize and protect
the laborer’s property interest in the new value he creates. There are, for
example, many serious moral problems with slavery, but one of those
problems is that the valuable fruits of slave labor were stolen from persons
regarded as slaves. Indeed, the very point of reparations would be to
correct this grave injustice.
The question then arises as to why such factors would plausibly
support a claim of fairness that warrants recognizing and protecting the
property rights in the object. Adam Moore offers the following possibility,
arguing that intellectual property protection is presumptively justified in
virtue of protecting the author’s sovereignty: “[L]abor, intellectual effort,
and creation are generally voluntary activities that can be unpleasant,
exhilarating, and everything in-between. That we voluntarily do these
things as sovereign moral agents may be enough to warrant noninterference
claims against others.”42 Moral principles protecting the sovereignty of
a rational agent, on this view, will protect the agent’s investment of
something that requires an exertion of sorts. As long as no one is made
worse by the author’s ability to exclude others from the content she
creates, intellectual property protection is justified; this condition is
known as Pareto superiority. Thus, as long as the acquisition, so to
speak, of intellectual property is Pareto superior, legal protection of that
acquisition is, as a matter of political morality, justified.
Here it is worth noting that Moore makes two important moves. First,
rather than grounding his argument in Locke’s claim that people have
property rights in their bodies and labor, Moore grounds his argument
for intellectual property rights in the status of a person as a sovereign
moral agent. This avoids the problems of begging the question and
misconceiving the moral relationship between oneself and one’s body
and labor, including intellectual labor, to which Locke’s argument gives
rise, and replaces it with the much more plausible claim, presupposed by
the very idea that people are accountable for their behavior and have
moral claims against other people, that people have the special moral

42.
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status of sovereign moral agent (or, preferably, persons with autonomy
rights)—a status that requires moral respect from other beings that have
this same status. Second, he assumes a somewhat weaker limiting condition
on original acquisition than the Lockean proviso requiring that enough
and as good be left for others. Moore takes the position that the acquisition
is justified if Pareto superior. Both of these features will be discussed
below.
D. Status Justifications of Rights vs. Instrumental
Justifications of Rights
As mentioned above, Moore presupposes that it is the status of a
human being as a sovereign moral agent that justifies protecting certain
rights. This amounts to what is called a status justification for the
existence of a moral right that ought to be protected by law. In the case
of an act-consequentialist or “instrumentalist” justification, however, there
are no moral rights. Legal rights are justified by their effects on the
promotion of the relevant consequences; as Mill puts it, the effects of
recognizing a legal right are so important that Mill seems to conceptualize
rights in terms of what society ought to protect:
When we call anything a person’s right, we mean that he has a valid claim on
society to protect him in the possession of it, either by the force of law, or by
that of education and opinion. . . . To have a right, then, is, I conceive, to have
something which society ought to defend me in the possession of.43

Moreover, Mill’s justification is clearly act-consequentialist: “those
possessive relations [that is, which constitute rights] that are valuable
enough that it is worthwhile for society to institute sanctions to protect
them.”44 Here, “value” is best understood in terms of the effects on
social utility so as to cohere with Mill’s act-consequentialism.
One problem with an act-consequentialist approach to justifying legal
protection of rights, as we have seen, is that it seems to presuppose a
conception of rights that lacks the most important moral feature of
rights: the ability to trump the effects of the protection on the desired
state of affairs. Legal rights will always be qualified by the utility of

43. JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM 78–79 (Electric Book Co. 2001) (1863).
44. Leif Wenar, Rights, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (July 2, 2011), http://plato.
stanford.edu/entries/rights/ (emphasis added) (quoting unidentified passage from Mill).
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protecting them and thus have no real teeth, as the transplant example
discussed above shows.45
The problem here is that the only morally salient factor in evaluating
an act is its tendency to promote the favored consequences. When an
agent decides how to act, no one’s interests or utility counts for more
than another person’s. As Bernard Williams puts it by way of criticism,
the moral status of people is defined entirely by being receptacles, so to
speak, of pleasure, utility, happiness, et cetera. It has nothing to do with
people being rational, moral agents, or free agents.46 Indeed, as Peter
Singer approvingly points out, it implies that animal pleasure and pain is
morally on par with equal amounts of human pleasure and pain and hence
supports moral vegetarianism.47 Even if one is sympathetic to moral
vegetarianism because animals have a morally protected interest in being
free of unnecessary suffering, as I am, act-consequentialism seems
utterly unacceptable because it ignores the qualities that seem intuitively
to account for a special moral status as persons with rights to autonomy,
et cetera.
The views of Williams and Singer help to shed light on the deeper
problem with act-utilitarianism. Although act-consequentialist justifications
are considered instrumentalist in character, the basic assumption that
dictates the fleshed out contours of the theory is a status-based assumption
that assigns no special moral status to human beings apart from their
capacity to experience pleasure, happiness, well-being, et cetera—capacities
they seem to share with animals. This (1) seems intuitively implausible
and is certainly incompatible with many ordinary moral judgments
involving people and involving animals; and (2) results in a moral calculus
that entails unacceptable answers to many moral issues because the
45. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
46. J.J.C. SMART & BERNARD WILLIAMS, UTILITARIANISM: FOR AND AGAINST 116–
17 (1973). As Williams famously puts it:
The point is that [the agent] is identified with his actions as flowing from
projects or attitudes which . . . he takes seriously at the deepest level, as what
his life is about . . . . It is absurd to demand of such a man, when the sums
come in from the utility network which the projects of others have in part
determined, that he should just step aside from his own project and decision
and acknowledge the decision which utilitarian calculation requires. It is to
alienate him in a real sense from his actions and the source of his action in his
own convictions. It is to make him into a channel between the input of
everyone’s projects, including his own, and an output of optimific decision;
but this is to neglect the extent to which his actions and his decisions have to
be seen as the actions and decisions which flow from the projects and attitudes
with which he is most closely identified. It is thus, in the most literal sense, an
attack on his integrity.
Id.
47. See generally Peter Singer, All Animals Are Equal, in ANIMAL RIGHTS AND
HUMAN OBLIGATIONS 148 (Tom Regan & Peter Singer eds., 1976).
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status-based assumption not only provides no real protection of individuals
in the form of rights, but seems logically inconsistent with them.
There are, in contrast, rule-consequentialist approaches that differ
from act-consequentialist approaches in the following way: whereas the
right thing to do on an act-consequentialist view is that which maximizes
consequences, the right thing to do on a rule-consequentialist view is that
which conforms to the set of rules that if always followed would maximize
utility.48 This would allow for the existence of rights defined by the
rules. But, strictly speaking, this does not seem to incorporate a reductively
consequentialist foundation; after all, there is no pure consequentialist
justification for the favoring of a set of rules that maximizes utility in
circumstances when departing from this set actually maximizes utility.
Rule-utilitarianism seems like an ad hoc consequentialist device to avoid
the problems of act-utilitarianism without changing the basis for moral
status; but because of its implicit moral valuation of rules, it is not
utterly implausible to characterize it as a weak form of deontological
theory, which, again, entails nothing more than that something other
than utility is sometimes relevant in determining the moral quality of an
act.
The more common approach is the status-based approach that has its
beginnings in Kant and is adopted by Locke, Nozick, John Rawls,
Robert Merges, Moore, and many other property theorists and theorists
concerned with economic justice. On this view, people have a certain
status—moral “personhood”—that is grounded in certain morally salient
characteristics, such as theoretical and practical rationality, free will, and
the ability to form and execute plans that reflect agent ends that make
life meaningful. As Warren Quinn described the justification for rights:
A person is constituted by his body and his mind. They are parts or aspects
of him. For that very reason, it is fitting that he have primary say over what
may be done to them—not because such an arrangement best promotes overall
human welfare, but because any arrangement that denied him that say would
be a grave indignity. In giving him this authority, morality recognizes his existence

48. Although Mill is commonly characterized as an act-utilitarian, I have argued
elsewhere that he is neither an act-utilitarian nor rule-utilitarian. Rather he is something
in between: a “tendency utilitarian.” According to this view, the source of the moral
obligation to perform an act resides entirely in its tendency to promote utility; thus,
conformity or failure-of-conformity to a rule is not any part of what makes an act right or
wrong. Acts are right or wrong because they tend or do not tend to promote utility and not
because they conform or fail to conform to an applicable moral rule. See generally Kenneth
Einar Himma, The Interpretation of Mill’s Utilitarianism, 15 HIST. PHIL. Q. 455 (1998).
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as an individual with ends of his own—an independent being. Since that is
what he is, he deserves this recognition.49

The idea is that there is some attribute of the person—being “an individual
with ends of his own”—that requires respect and recognition from other
persons. But if the only relevant attribute is that the individual has ends
of his own, the foundation for Quinn’s claims about human status arguably
is not strong enough to do the work. The recognition that is due to each
individual can be accorded to that individual by recognizing the moral
rights that go along with this status and affording them legal protection,
among which is a moral right to autonomy.
Thus, rights are not, as in a consequentialist or instrumentalist conception,
justified in virtue of the consequences they promote. As Quinn describes
the status approach:
It is not that we think it fitting to ascribe rights because we think it is a good
thing that rights be respected. Rather we think respect for rights a good thing
precisely because we think people actually have them—and . . . that they have
them because it is fitting that they should.50

On this view, the idea is that people have moral rights in virtue of moral
status that should be recognized, respected, and protected by law. Indeed,
as was noted above, the principal disagreement between the abortionrights proponent and the abortion-rights opponent is that the latter believes,
while the former generally does not, that the fetus has this special moral
status that affords it a natural moral right to life that entails abortion is
murder and must be criminalized by a legitimate state.
There is another important question regarding rights, and that question
concerns the function of rights—a related but very distinct question from
the justification of rights. There are two theories of the function of rights:
will theory and interest theory. According to the will theory, the function of
rights is to make the rights-holder sovereign over a particular duty owed
by someone else.51 The important idea here is the status of a rights-holder
as a sovereign agent exercising dominion over a particular claim to
something. In contrast, an interest theory holds that the function of rights
is to protect the interests of human beings.52
Both theories are theories of the function of a right and not a theory of
the justification of a right; as such, a theory of the function of a right

49. WARREN QUINN, MORALITY AND ACTION 170 (1993) (footnote omitted).
50. Id. at 173.
51. See generally H.L.A. HART, ESSAYS ON BENTHAM: STUDIES IN JURISPRUDENCE
AND POLITICAL THEORY (1982).
52. For a contemporary formulation of the interest theory, see, for example,
Matthew H. Kramer, Getting Rights Right, in RIGHTS, WRONGS AND RESPONSIBILITIES 28
(Matthew H. Kramer ed., 2001).
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does not logically imply a theory of the justification of a right. So each
theory of the function of rights is compatible with each theory of the
justification of rights. Moore’s theory does not necessarily presuppose a
will theory but his emphasis on people being sovereign agents as the ground
for a right suggests that he has something like this in mind, although he
is clearly a status theorist when it comes to justification of rights.
In what follows, I take the position that moral rights are justified in
virtue of the special moral status that human beings have as “persons,”
which is distinct from the status of being a human being, as the notion of
a human being is a biological, empirical concept. But I will rely on the
entire array of moral qualities that seem to contribute to this special
moral status—including but not limited to those on which Moore relies
in his contribution to this issue53: capacity for autonomy, rationality, free
agency, et cetera. In addition, I see no reason to reject either the will
theory of rights or the interest theory of rights, although I think the latter
is the most important function rights play and so assume something like
a hybrid theory.
E. Limiting Conditions on Original Acquisition:
The Lockean Proviso and Pareto Superiority
Moore understands the importance of a limiting condition on original
acquisition and hence understands the importance of the Lockean proviso
that there be enough of similar quality for all others in supporting the
claim that one acquires a property right in the products of one’s intellectual
labor. It is this premise that does much of the work in explaining why
one does not simply lose one’s labor in conditions of original acquisition.
Instead of the Lockean proviso, Moore incorporates a somewhat more
sophisticated limiting mechanism on original acquisition: the principle
of Pareto superiority. The principle of Pareto superiority functions in the
following way as a limiting condition of gaining property rights in original
acquisition: investing one’s labor in an unowned object gives the laborer
a property right in the object provided that no one else is made worse off
by the acquisition of the object.54
This principle differs from the Lockean proviso in that it allows
original acquisition in more circumstances than just the situation in
53. See generally Adam D. Moore, A Lockean Theory of Intellectual Property
Revisited, 49 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1069 (2012).
54. See MOORE, supra note 39, at 109–14.
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which acquisition leaves as much and as good for everyone else. If the
Lockean proviso is satisfied, then the principle of Pareto superiority is
satisfied. As Locke put the point:
[H]e that leaves as much as another can make use of does as good as take
nothing at all. Nobody could think himself injured by the drinking of another
man, though he took a good draught, who had a whole river of the same water
left him to quench his thirst; and the case of land and water, where there is
enough for both, is perfectly the same.55

But the converse is not necessarily true. One might think that an
acquisition under circumstances in which the Lockean proviso is not
satisfied creates a condition of scarcity that must worsen the position of
everyone else to some extent. But there can be circumstances in which a
particular resource is of idiosyncratic interest to only a comparatively
small class of individuals, the others being indifferent with respect to the
resource. In such cases, the others might be made better off by the
acquisition even though the Lockean proviso is thereby violated without
anyone else being made worse off. Under these circumstances, the principle
of Pareto superiority would allow the acquisition where the Lockean
proviso would not. Thus, Moore’s theory of justified original acquisition
allows acquisition in more circumstances than a pure Lockean theory of
justified original acquisition.
Both moves by Moore provide a promising beginning for a successful
argument justifying legal protection of intellectual property. Although
my argument is status based, assuming something like Moore’s observation
that people are sovereign moral agents deserving of a certain kind of
moral respect, I will choose a somewhat different mechanism as a limiting
condition for original acquisition of intellectual property. If the existence of
moral rights depends on the moral status of persons and the underlying
quality that grounds this status, and one of the functions of rights is to
further the interests of persons, then it seems reasonable to think that one
must consider the specific interests of all persons in a piece of content
that will transcend the interest in not having one’s position worsened,
and weigh them according to what I take to be a more plausible moral
scale.

55.
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VI. A COMMON SHORTCOMING IN THE INVESTMENT ARGUMENTS FOR
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION
The discussion of the status theory of justification above—and the last
paragraph of the last Part—suggests that many investment arguments for
intellectual property seem to be vulnerable to a common objection.
Whereas the arguments against intellectual property seem to give short
shrift to the issue of whether authors have a morally protected interest in
their creations, most of the investment arguments seem to give short
shrift to the issue of whether people have a morally protected interest in
the content created by others. Surely, if the interests of the authors are
relevant, so are the interests of other persons.56 Indeed, one might plausibly
believe that there might be content so important to humanity that the
interests of other people, taken together, defeat whatever interest the
author has in that content, even if other persons are not harmed by allowing
the acquisition.
To see the problem, consider again some of the investment arguments.
Although a pure Lockean argument would be qualified by the proviso
that there be enough of the resource left to others, the interests of others
count only insofar as they are not harmed.57 Likewise, Moore’s theory
justifies legal protection of intellectual property protection only to the
extent that it is Pareto superior. On Moore’s view, intellectual property
protection is justified only insofar as it makes the author better off
56. It is worth noting here that McFarland never considers the extent to which the
lives of others might be worsened by giving an author exclusive control over the content
of her creation. All that matters to McFarland is the difficult work invested by the author
in the content she creates. See McFarland, supra note 41.
57. Another species of argument from investment not considered above is what I
will call the “personality argument,” which originates with G.W.F. Hegel and takes a
variety of forms. See, e.g., G.W.F. HEGEL, ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 67–
103 (Allen W. Wood ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1991) (1820). At the foundation of
each such argument, however, is the idea that an individual enjoys an exclusive moral
claim to the acts and content of his or her personality, personality being understood to
include a variety of character traits, dispositions, preferences, experiences, and
knowledge. This special claim to personality is sometimes understood as ownership or
something closely analogous to ownership; thus understood, it would resemble the
foundation of the classical Lockean justification for property, which relies upon the
claim that we own our body and its activities. The idea here is that the claim of
ownership over one’s personality will extend to the products of, so to speak, one’s
expenditures of personality through acts that express it. As newly created content
derives from the expenditure of the author’s personality and in some sense instantiates
the author’s personality, the author owns the content. Personality arguments having this
form do not consider the interests of other persons in content created by an author at all.
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without worsening the position of other people, which I take to be a
“harm” of sorts. 58 It seems clear that an adequate evaluation of the
propriety of intellectual property protection must assess all the interests
that people might have in some piece of intellectual content—and not
just the interest in not being harmed.
Although some have argued that legal protection of intellectual property
always worsens the position of other persons,59 arguments from investment
that include mechanisms like the Lockean proviso or principle of Pareto
superiority presuppose that the only relevant interest that other persons
have in content created by someone else is that they not be made worse
off or harmed by a legal property right on the part of the author that
permits the author to exclude other persons from content he has created.
But there is no reason to suppose that this is the only interest people
have in content created by others that is morally relevant in determining
the extent to which legal protection of intellectual property is morally
justified. People clearly have prudential interests in being benefitted: it
always conduces to my best interests to be the recipient of what is
properly characterized as a “benefit.”60 It is surely true that not all
prudential interests in being benefitted are protected by morality, but it
is also true that some are. At the very least, it is presumptively morally
good that a person’s acts result in benefits to others. But there are surely
circumstances in which conferring benefits on others is morally obligatory

58. As Moore puts the point:
If no one is harmed by an acquisition and one person is bettered, then the
acquisition ought to be permitted. In fact, it is precisely because no one is
harmed that it seems unreasonable to object to [what is known as] a Paretosuperior move. Thus, the proviso can be understood as a version of a “no
harm, no foul” principle.
MOORE, supra note 39, at 109.
59. Jeremy Waldron suggests that intellectual property rights always make others
worse off than they would have been. If, for example, A discovers the only possible cure
for cancer and perversely decides to withhold it from everyone with cancer, the cancer
patients seem worse off in the following sense: they had a positive chance of survival
prior to A’s exclusive appropriation because, after all, someone else might have discovered it
and made it freely available; now this chance is denied them. Although such patients
might achieve spontaneous remission, their chances of becoming cancer-free are
significantly reduced by A’s exclusive appropriation of the cure. For this reason, on
Waldron’s view, the patients are made worse off by this appropriation. Indeed, as any
person could be stricken with cancer, one could argue that all persons are made worse off
by A’s exclusive appropriation. See Jeremy Waldron, From Authors to Copiers:
Individual Rights and Social Values in Intellectual Property, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 841,
866–68 (1993).
60. Someone might be mistaken in characterizing some effect of an act as a
“benefit.” A heroin addict presumably regards a free dose of heroin as a benefit, but
from an objective or even impersonal point of view, she would seem to be mistaken in
this characterization, as the continued use of heroin is highly likely to result in harm to
the addict.
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and in which what one may permissibly do is limited, from the standpoint
of morality, by others’ interests in being benefitted.
Consider the following example from Peter Singer.61 An adult notices
an infant face down at the edge of a nearby pond in some very shallow
water and can see the infant is flailing. Instead of simply bending over
and removing the infant from the water, a gesture that would cost no more
than a few seconds and some wet hands, he walks by without doing
anything and allows the infant to drown. It seems clear that the adult has
done something grievously wrong, which entails, at the very least, that
we have a moral obligation to help those in need when it can be done
without significantly worsening one’s own position. If so, then morality
sometimes requires that we confer benefits on others and hence, that we
must weigh our interests against the interests of others in our deliberations
about what we should do.
The important point here is not the conclusion Singer draws from the
example, as that inference is problematic. He believes he can infer the
much stronger principle that we have a moral obligation to confer benefits
on people so long as it does not cost us something of proportional
value.62 On Singer’s view, I would have to risk my arm to save a life.
The reason that he cannot derive that principle from the example is that
in the example, the adult is not risking anything remotely close to being
disproportionate; the moral benefits so exceed the moral costs that it
would be heinous not to help. The point here is simply to point out that
the vast majority of people believe there are some circumstances in
which we have to take into account the benefits to others in moral
deliberations about what to do. If the reader accepts this point, then he
or she is committed to the methodology I describe in the next paragraph
or must counter it with an argument—and that is all I need to accomplish
with this example.
Accordingly, if the two interpretations of the Lockean justification of
material property rights fail to show that the expenditure of labor is
sufficient to create property rights in intellectual or material objects, they
are suggestive of a plausible approach for determining whether someone
should be afforded a limited legal right to exclude others from appropriation
of an object. To determine whether the law should allow someone to

61. Peter Singer, Famine, Affluence, and Morality, in INTERNATIONAL ETHICS 247,
249–51 (Charles R. Beitz et al. eds., 1985).
62. Id. at 249.
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exclude others from appropriating some material or intellectual object,
we must weigh all the competing interests. If my interests in X outweigh
the interests of all other parties, then that proposition is a pretty good
reason, although not necessarily a conclusive one, to think that my interests
in X are justifiably protected by the law.
At this point, an important objection suggests itself. One might think
that weighing of interests to determine what interests should be protected
by law is a consequentialist justification. It is not. Deontological theories
are compatible with taking consequences into account in a variety of
ways. For example, one might take consequences into account in
determining whether one should go beyond the call of duty, as in a case
where someone rescues others from a burning building. In contrast, the
idea of an act’s being beyond the call of duty is incompatible with actconsequentialist theories because one’s only duty is to maximize utility;
there is no other good that could be pursued only by going beyond the
call of duty. Similarly, there is no reason to think that the limits of the
content of a right cannot be explained by considerations having to do
with consequences. Once the content of the right is fixed, it trumps
consequences. But consequences might rightly, and commonly do, figure
into determining the content of a right.63
Most importantly, however, is that weighing the moral importance of
an interest does not necessarily involve aggregating and assessing the
consequences for the community of infringing it. The moral importance
of the interest in life is not at all diminished by the fact that one’s life
might be so painful that one might wish to end one’s life. No matter
what the conditions of a person’s life are, standard views hold that he
has a moral right to life. What he can permissibly do about the painful
quality of his life is a separate moral matter.
This point can be seen in another issue involving the moral right to
life. The right to life is generally thought qualified by a moral principle
that allows one to use deadly force if it reasonably appears necessary to
save one’s life from a culpable attack. The question is whether the
conditions under which use of deadly force is morally permissible extend to
imminent threats to a person’s life that do not involve a culpable attack,
as when someone who is known to be insane attempts to kill a person.
Some theorists argue that moral principles of self-defense allow deadly
force in such cases,64 while others deny this.65 In resolving such issues,

63. Ideally, a theory is needed to justify this claim, but as most people would
accept these claims and my methodology is one of reflective equilibrium, this need not
be done here.
64. See, for example, Judith Jarvis Thomson, Self-Defense, 20 PHIL. & PUB. AFF.
283 (1991), for an interesting discussion of various difficult cases.
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one has to take into account a number of factors that might qualify the
right to life and weigh them—for example, culpability, considerations of
fairness, and the circumstances of the threat to life. But this does not
involve deciding the issue simply on the basis of which has the most
desirable consequences. Even when consequences figure into the weighing
calculus, they will be weighed against factors other than consequences.
The mistake, then, that most theorists make in their attempts to justify
original acquisition of intellectual property rights that should be protected
by law is to limit the relevant interests of other people in content to
simply not being harmed or made worse off. It seems clear from most
other intuitive moral contexts that we must take into account the interests
that other people have in being benefitted. This, I believe, is something
that must be done in an argument justifying intellectual property if for no
other reason than the opponents of intellectual property rights claim that
they are being deprived of something that confers important benefits on
them.
Of course, I do not pretend to have some sort of algorithm for assessing
the various interests.66 Weighing competing interests is a messy, imprecise
business that relies much more heavily on gut level reactions and feelings
than other ethical arguments. Still, it is fair to say that all ethical theorizing,
applied, general, and metaethical, is, at the end of the day, grounded in
such gut-level intuitions. The imprecise character of such reasoning surely
diminishes the level of confidence we can have in any conclusions it
supports.
Even so, there are easy cases. One reason that most people agree that
it would be wrong for me to shoot someone in the back as he flees with
my stolen property is that our interests in life are much more weighty
than our interests in property; in just about every case, a thief’s interest
in his life is much more important than my interest in the property he
65. Michael Otsuka argues that there is no morally significant difference between
innocent attackers and innocent bystanders. Both are immunized from infringement of
their rights by persons defending against culpable attack by the fact that they bear no
moral responsibility for the attack. See Michael Otsuka, Killing the Innocent in SelfDefense, 23 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 74 (1994).
66. For a very plausible nonalgorithmic device for balancing competing claims,
see MOORE, supra note 39, at 103–17, 147–74. Moore argues for something he calls the
weak Pareto proviso: If the acquisition of an intangible object makes no one else worse
off in terms of her level of well-being—including opportunity costs—compared to how
she was immediately before the acquisition, then the taking is permitted. Id. at 109–12.
As is readily evident, the weak Pareto proviso attempts to balance all the competing
interests.
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steals from me.67 Life, after all, is “sacred,” and property is not. For this
reason, most people—and the criminal law in every Western nation—
agree that property may not be defended with deadly force—although
some states like New York allow deadly force to prevent arson.68
I think there are some fairly easy assessments in the case of intellectual
objects. As I will argue below, content creators have a stronger interest
in the time and effort they expend in creating content not needed to survive
or thrive than the interests that other persons have in that content.
Because I lack an algorithm for assessing these interests, my argument will
rely on what I believe are widely-shared intuitive reactions to certain cases.
But although I do not have an argument for thinking that my reactions to
these cases are the correct ones, I think most readers will share my reactions
to these cases and are hence committed to the conclusions I defend in
this Article.
A comprehensive evaluation of the range of legitimate legal protection
of intellectual property must consider all morally relevant interests of
persons in the content created by others, and this goes beyond merely
considering their interests in not being harmed. Morally protected interests
in being benefitted must also be considered. As will be seen below, this
requires identifying and weighing the interests of all persons in a particular
kind of content.
VII. ASSESSING THE INTERESTS OF AUTHORS AND OTHERS
At this point, it seems clear that a fully adequate evaluation of
intellectual property rights will have to consider all the interests that
people might have in intellectual content. If the investment arguments
fail to show that the expenditure of labor is sufficient to create property
rights in intellectual or material objects, they do have the virtue of
considering the issue of whether authors have a morally protected interest in
their creations. As such, the investment arguments are suggestive of a
plausible approach for determining whether someone should be afforded
a limited legal right to exclude others from appropriation of an object.
To determine whether the law should allow someone to exclude others
from appropriating some material or intellectual object, we must weigh
all the competing interests. If my interests in X are sufficiently strong
and outweigh the interests of all other parties, then that fact is a pretty
good reason, though not necessarily a conclusive one, to think that my
interests in X are justifiably protected by the law.

67. In a case where the thief steals something from me that is necessary for my
survival, the calculus seems different to me.
68. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.20(1) (McKinney 2009).

1152

[VOL. 49: 1105, 2012]

Legal Protection of Intellectual Property
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

A. Intrinsic and Instrumental Value
In determining what morally protected interests a particular kind of
thing might have, philosophers frequently distinguish two kinds of value.
An entity has “instrumental value” if and only if it has value as a means
to some other valuable end. In contrast, an entity has “intrinsic value” if
and only if it has value as an end-in-itself. Money is an example of
something with only instrumental value; while money clearly has value as
a means to other ends like nutrition and recreation, it does not seem to
have any value as an end-in-itself. In contrast, one’s own happiness is an
example of something with intrinsic value. While it might make sense to
value some other person’s happiness as a means to some other end, it
makes little sense to think of one’s own happiness as primarily a means to
some other end.
The distinction between intrinsic and instrumental value has been
thought by many to provide the foundation for at least two important
questions in ethics. As the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy puts it,
“[i]ntrinsic value has traditionally been thought to lie at the heart of
ethics . . . [and] to be crucial to a variety of moral judgments.”69
For our purposes, there are two judgments of particular importance.
First, whether a thing T has intrinsic value contributes to determining
whether moral agents owe T any moral obligations; that is to say, it
contributes to determining whether and what kind of “moral standing” T
has. Entities or beings with intrinsic value in this sense are moral
patients entitled to some level of moral respect. Unlike something with
only instrumental value, an entity with intrinsic value in this sense may
not be used by an agent without some thought to its interests. Whereas
the appropriate manner for thinking about things with only instrumental
value is cost-benefit analysis, intrinsically valuable things have a right to
some consideration in a moral agent’s deliberations. For example,
proponents of moral vegetarianism argue that any being capable of
suffering has moral standing that implies a right to be free from
unnecessary pain. Similarly, human beings are thought to have a special
kind of moral standing that affords moral rights to life, liberty, and
property in virtue of being alive, sentient, and rational. Accordingly,
intrinsic value confers upon a being a moral status that entails that moral

69. Michael J. Zimmerman, Intrinsic vs. Extrinsic Value, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA
PHIL. (Dec. 17, 2010), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/value-intrinsic-extrinsic/.
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agents owe that being at least one moral obligation—if only to consider
its interests in deciding what to do from the standpoint of morality.
Second, the concept of intrinsic value can be used to identify which
interests of a being with moral standing are morally protected interests.
For example, act-utilitarianism is grounded in the idea that the only
intrinsically valuable interests are the interests in achieving pleasure and
avoiding pain. It is for this reason that act-utilitarianism requires that
persons attempt to promote pleasure and decrease pain with their actions.
There are two concepts of intrinsic value that potentially figure into
determining which interests are morally protected—one primarily
normative and the other primarily descriptive. The normative concept is
concerned with what rational moral agents ought to value as deserving
of respect as ends-in-themselves. An entity that is intrinsically valuable
in this sense has value as an end-in-itself regardless of whether any rational
agents actually value it this way. Thus, attributions of this kind of value
are normative in the sense that they are independent of the actual valuations
of rational agents: if every rational agent failed to value an entity E
with intrinsic value in this sense, each would be making a moral mistake.
Attributions of intrinsic value in this normative sense are disconnected
from what we actually value as an empirical matter.
In contrast, the descriptive concept is concerned with identifying the
sort of ends we characteristically pursue. The issue here is what as an
empirical matter we typically regard worth pursuing for its own sake.
An entity has intrinsic value in this sense if and only if, as an empirical
matter, an appreciable number of us actually value it as an end-in-itself;
a thing has instrumental value if and only if an appreciable number of us
value it as a means.
The moral significance of being regarded as an end-in-itself by moral
persons—of having intrinsic value in the descriptive sense—is different
from that of being owed an obligation of respect—of having intrinsic
value in the normative sense. As persons, we have a morally protected
interest in what we typically intrinsically value that is fundamental in not
deriving from some other more basic interest. Persons have a special
moral status in the world in virtue of being, or potentially being, both
moral agents with obligations and moral patients with rights—including
the moral right to autonomy. Respect for beings with this status entails
some measure of respect for their characteristic ultimate ends.
This helps to explain why we have—assuming we do have such
rights—moral rights to life, liberty, and physical safety. As an empirical
matter, we typically view continued conscious existence, liberty, and
physical safety as vitally important ends-in-themselves; we care
passionately about these things for their own sakes—and not merely
because they are useful for other purposes. Given the vital intrinsic
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importance of these ends, it is not surprising that they are the objects of
fundamental rights.
Beings with intrinsic value are owed a duty of moral respect for their
legitimate interests. How much respect is owed regarding an interest
depends, in part, on what kind of value the interest has. The strongest
forms of respect such as moral rights are normally but not necessarily
accorded to those interests that are intrinsically valuable to the being
owed a duty of respect in virtue of its being intrinsically valuable.
Human beings are persons who are the beneficiaries of the strongest
forms of moral respect, which typically apply to those interests that are
characteristically valued as ends-in-themselves—and should be valued
as such. In what follows, I will attempt to ground a justification for
intellectual property rights in interests that are intrinsically valuable to
persons.
B. Interests of Authors in Their Time and Labor
This much should be clear at the outset: content creators have a
prudential interest—an interest from the standpoint of objective or
perceived self-interest—in controlling use and dissemination of their
creations. To devote time and energy to creating intellectual content,
time and energy must be diverted from other activities. This means that
any particular deployment of time and energy involves costs that are
significant from the standpoint of prudential rationality, including
opportunity costs involved when one forgoes other opportunities to
devote resources to a particular activity.70
It is important to emphasize that the prudential interest is of profound
significance. My time and energy matter a great deal to me because I
know that I have a limited supply of both. Like everyone else, I am a
finite being with an all-too-limited life span. Every moment I devote to
a particular task spends one of a limited supply of moments I have in life
to do all the things that make life worth living.
Indeed, my prudential interest in not wasting or squandering my time
and energy go this far. Even if I do not feel like working, my time could

70. Some of the analysis in this Part appears in Kenneth Einar Himma, Justifying
Intellectual Property Protection: Why the Interests of Content Creators Usually Win
over Everyone Else’s, in INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 47 (Emma
Rooksby & John Weckert eds., 2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=840584.
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be spent doing something that has value to me. Though we tend
(incorrectly, on my view) to think of play and rest as counterproductive, I
think it is clear that sometimes time invested in rest and recreation is
well spent. As paradoxical as this may sound, I would rather not waste
time that can be spent watching or playing basketball when I have that
time available for those purposes.
And, as I grow progressively older, my time and energy become
increasingly precious to me. There are three reasons for this: one biological
and the others psychological. First, and most obviously, our available
supplies of time and energy get smaller as we get nearer to the end of our
lifespans. Second, we tend to become more sensitive to our own mortality
as we grow older. It is a well-known fact that older people have a far more
acute sense of their own mortality than younger people and that this
sense becomes more acute over time. Third, a person’s experience of time
tends to change as she grows older: the passage of a year is experienced
as having occurred much more quickly by an older person than by a
younger person.
As a general matter, these elements lead people to assign more value
to expenditures of time and energy as they grow older because all draw
attention to the unhappy fact that their supply of moments is limited. It
seems clear, then, that as a descriptive empirical matter, people generally
regard their time and their energy as prudentially valuable.
It is true, of course, that the mere fact that people generally have a
prudential interest in something tells us little about whether they have a
morally protected interest in it. By itself, the claim that X wants or values
something does not imply that X has a morally protected interest in it.
People commonly want and value things, like prestige and power over
others, to which morality affords no significant protection.
But the point here is not just the descriptive point that people
generally value their time and energy: it should also be clear that as a
normative matter of practical rationality, people should regard their time
and energy as prudentially valuable. Someone who cares nothing about
how she spends her time and energy is fairly characterized as doing a
disservice to herself—and perhaps to the community in general. Indeed,
such an attitude may signal some psychological disease; people who are
severely depressed, for example, frequently lose interest in what they
formerly viewed as important. It is probably too strong to think that
someone who cares nothing about how his time and energy are spent is
always severely depressed; such an attitude may signal some other
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psychological disorder.71 But it is clearly irrational from the standpoint
of prudential interest to care so little about what is, in essence, the
central resource for pursuing the goods that make life worth living.
The reason for this has to do with what qualities contribute to our
standing as persons with natural moral rights. Many people plausibly
believe that animals have a moral claim against us not to cause them
unnecessary suffering. What gives rise to the limited claim is the fact
that higher animals are sentient and capable of suffering. If a cow feels
the same pain that a human does upon being burned alive, what moral
difference could it possibly make that people can add but cows cannot?
Pain is pain wherever instantiated.
Intriguingly, the capacity to suffer cannot give rise to a right to life; it
simply gives rise to a right not to be caused unnecessary suffering by
human beings. If human beings raise cattle in humane circumstances
and slaughter them painlessly, then no obligations have been breached.
But human beings have a greater range of rights because of their capacity
for rationality, which makes possible the capacity of autonomy—the
capacity to frame plans and execute them without coercive interference.
People have goals and devote time to them, and this also contributes to
the value of their interests in continuing life. Goals are always the
reason for work, and goals cannot be realized except by living to see it;
as such it seems reasonable to suppose that human beings, unlike animals,
have a right to life.
In any event, the normative import of such interests from the standpoint
of rationality, then, provides some reason to think that the prudential
interests we have in our time and energy receive some protection from
morality. Human beings have the special moral status of personhood
that confers fundamental moral rights to respect and autonomy, and it is
hard to see how one could adequately respect a person without respecting
those interests that are central to her flourishing in all the ways that she
should. This is why, for example, the moral obligation to respect persons
demands that we respect their lives and their autonomy.
It is reasonable to think, then, that others should respect those interests
that have the importance to beings like us that time and energy have.
Again, the point is not just that some of us do care about our time and
energy, or even that we all do care about these resources; rather, the point is

71. See generally AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS (4th ed. 2000). I am grateful to Sam Rickless for pointing this out to me.
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that we all should care about how we spend our time and energy because
they are so central to ensuring that we flourish in all the ways that we
should. This distinguishes our interests in such matters from interests
that are more trivial from a moral point of view, such as our interests in
even more affluent standards of living that allow us, say, to buy bigger
and more expensive cars. Moral respect for persons surely requires respect
for those interests that are utterly central to ensuring that persons flourish in
all the ways that they, morally speaking, should flourish. Without time
and energy, none of us can flourish in any of the ways we should; these
resources are utterly central to our well-being and flourishing. If this is
so, then it is reasonable to think that our interests in our own time and
energy receive significant protection from morality.
Of course, morality and prudential rationality sometimes diverge. It
might be that not everything that is reasonably in my interest is of moral
value or receives moral protection. Perhaps it is rational from the
narrow standpoint of self-interest to prefer having power over other
people to not having power over other people. I am not entirely sure
about even this, but it seems clear to me that such an interest has no
value from the standpoint of morality and hence does not receive any
moral protection—at least none specific to this particular interest.
But the idea that morality assigns no value to what is absolutely
necessary to pursue any of the things that human beings ought as a moral
matter to have seems paradoxical. We cannot pursue anything of moral
value without having time and energy. If we have any interests at all
that receive significant moral protection—as is true if we have any moral
standing at all and especially true if we have the special status of moral
personhood—because they are morally valuable, then the limited supply
of time and energy available to each of us must be valuable from the
standpoint of morality because these are the resources that must be spent
to pursue any other interests at all. Having time and energy is a
precondition for achieving any other interests. This makes our time and
energy very important.
At the very least, this means that as a moral matter, we should care
enough about the expenditure of our time and energy not to waste them.
I think it also means that we should care enough about the time and
energy of other people not to waste them. A person’s time and energy are
precious not only from a purely prudential point of view, but also from a
morally normative point of view. We should care about our and other
people’s time and energy because they are so central to ensuring that
human beings flourish in all the ways that human beings should flourish.
A stronger argument is available with respect to the moral significance
of our interests in our expenditures of time. It is reasonable to think that
we do value, and should value, our time as an end-in-itself, and not merely
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as a means. Although it might be true that energy is only instrumentally
valuable—valuable as a means to some other end—because it enables us
to achieve other ends by doing things, time is both instrumentally and
intrinsically valuable.72 Time is, of course, of considerable instrumental
value because having some time is a necessary condition to being able to
achieve any end; we can be and do nothing if we do not have an available
supply of time. But if continued sentient life is, as seems reasonable, of
considerable intrinsic value—valuable for its own sake as an end-initself—then it follows that having a supply of time is also of considerable
intrinsic value to a sentient being: someone who has no available time is
no longer alive. Indeed, on ordinary intuitions, the right to life is the
most important right. Since a life is constituted by a series of moments
of life, those moments also have significant intrinsic value.
To give a sense for how important these interests can be, consider two
people who live in a house built from the foundations up by one of the
two. If the building burns down, both residents sustain significant
losses. Both lose their place to live. Both lose their belongings. But
one of them loses the time and energy spent in building the house—and,
as a descriptive matter, this might be the most devastating loss of all. It
should be evident that one’s interests in one’s time and energy are hardly
trivial from a prudential point of view.
In any event, there are two points here—one descriptive and one
normative. The descriptive point is that people generally regard the
moments of their lives as ends-in-themselves and hence as valuable for
their own sakes. The normative point is that we ought to regard the
moments of our lives as ends-in-themselves and hence as valuable for
their own sakes. If we should regard our lives as intrinsically valuable,
then we should regard each moment as intrinsically valuable because,
again, a sentient life consists of the moments that a being remains sentient.
Moreover, it seems clear that people should also regard other people’s
time as intrinsically valuable as ends-in-themselves, precisely because
every other person’s time is and should be so intrinsically valuable to
him. If, as seems reasonable, we should value the lives of others as

72. For a discussion of the significance of the distinction between intrinsic and
instrumental value in ethical theorizing, see generally Kenneth Einar Himma, The Moral
Significance of the Internet in Information: Reflections on a Fundamental Moral Right to
Information, 2 J. INFO. COMM. & ETHICS SOC’Y 191 (2004); and Kenneth Einar Himma,
There’s Something About Mary: The Moral Value of Things Qua Information Objects, 6
ETHICS & INFO. TECH. 145 (2004).
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intrinsically valuable, then it follows that we should value the moments
that constitute those lives as intrinsically valuable.
The foregoing analysis suggests therefore that our prudential interests
in time are afforded significant protection by morality. Although the
claim that some resource r is, or ought to be, regarded as instrumentally
valuable does not imply that morality protects persons’ interests in r, the
claim that r is, and ought to be, regarded as intrinsically valuable does
seem to imply that morality protects the interest in r. As a matter of
substantive moral theory, what is, and ought to be, regarded as intrinsically
valuable to beings like us with the special moral status of personhood is
deserving of moral respect because these values constitute our ultimate
ends, and it is very difficult to make sense of the idea that we deserve
respect qua persons if what we ought to regard as our ultimate ends do
not deserve respect from others.
The question of what is owed by way of respect to another person for
her intrinsically valuable time is a complicated one because a conflict
can arise between the prudential interests of persons in many different
ways. Being significantly late to an appointment, other things being
equal, is disrespectful because it involves wasting another person’s time,
which can be used to do something else.
As regards intellectual property, what respect is owed to a person’s
expenditure of time and energy will be determined in part by other morally
relevant considerations. It is probably not true that the intrinsic value of
one person’s time spent in creating new content, by itself, requires
respect in the form of allowing him control of the uses to which the
content is put. The reason for this is that use of content is nonrivalrous and
does not involve its destruction. If, in contrast, I have expended my time
and energy into a making a table, then it would be wrong for another
person to take the table to keep or destroy. Or if I have written a book
and I have the only copy, then it would be wrong for another person to
take it from my possession to keep or destroy. In all such cases, morally
significant expenditures of my time and energy have wrongly been wasted.
In the case of content, however, it is not clear that simply consuming
the content of another person wrongfully wastes her time and energy,
precisely because the content remains intact for the author.73 But there
are other morally relevant considerations that, together with the value of
an author’s expenditure of time and energy, seem to provide at least a
prima facie case for allowing, within limits, a content creator to control
the use of what she has expended her time to create. First, the content
creator has created new value that would not have been available to others

73.
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without the creator’s efforts. Second, content creators create content for
many reasons but one of them is frequently to produce something that
can be sold; allowing them limited control over the content they create is
perfectly tailored to respect the content creators’ moral autonomy rights. It
seems only fair, if there are no countervailing moral interests of others in
that content,74 that the author has a prima facie morally protective interest in
control over the new value she has brought into the world not just by
virtue of the expenditure of morally-protected interests in her time and
energy but also by virtue of respect for her moral autonomy rights.75
Again, it is important to emphasize the moral significance of the right
to autonomy. As noted above, it is the very fact that coercive enforcement
mechanisms infringe a person’s right to autonomy that creates the problem
of legitimate state authority to begin with. It should not be surprising
that a person’s autonomy rights, together with her morally important
interests in her time and energy, should create in the author a morally
protected interest in excluding others from the content she creates.
There are many motives for creating content, of course: self-expression
and amusement being two of them. But in most cases an author’s plan is
to sell the content so as to permit her to continue creating content. I enjoy
teaching, for example, but one of the most important reasons I teach is
that it affords me the time to continue to create content. This is part of
the plan that I choose for my life, and my right to autonomy presumably
protects my ability to execute that plan, other things being equal, such as
the availability of a teaching job.

74. Whether other people have morally protected interests that outweigh the
author’s interests in her time and energy will be considered in the next subparts.
75. One could argue, of course, that authors who do not wish to give away their
creations should refrain from expending time in creating content, but one needs an
argument in support of this counterintuitive claim that goes beyond pointing out that
other people want those creations. As we have seen, the mere fact that someone wants
something does not entail that he has a morally protected interest in it.
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C. The Interests of Other Persons in Content
Authors are clearly not the only persons who care about intellectual
content; other persons also care a great deal about content. After all, there
would not be much of a dispute, as an empirical matter, about intellectual
property rights if people had no significant interests in content created or
discovered by others. This, of course, is not to say that there would not
be an issue, but only to suggest that people would not care so much about it
if they had no interests in such content. The intellectual property dispute
is contentious precisely because people care so much about the content
they create and the content created by others.
As before, many of these valuations are at least partly prudential in
character. I value intellectual content for both instrumental and intrinsic
reasons, but all these reasons are largely prudential. This is particularly
clear in the case of content I value instrumentally as a means to some
other end. I might value the content provided by an education because it
enables me to earn a better living and achieve a better quality of material
living than I could otherwise achieve. I might value a piece of music
because it gives me great pleasure when I listen to it. I might value a film
because it entertains me for a couple of hours and fills up the time.
This also seems to be true of some intellectual content we value
intrinsically. I value information about the existence and nature of God
for its own sake (as well, of course, as for instrumental reasons), but the
interests that I am looking to satisfy by my pursuit of such information
as an end are largely my own. I might value knowledge as an end-initself and hence pursue intellectual content for its value, but my pursuits
are still being motivated by my interests and priorities, which presumably
reflect some sort of view about my well-being. The value is an end-initself, but the motivation for pursuing it is at least partly because I have
an interest in it, and that content fulfills the interest and me.
If the above sounds a little odd, it might help to note that the claim
that my interest in some content is prudential does not imply that my
interest is selfish or self-centered. The notions of selfishness and selfcenteredness seem to connote the violation of some moral obligation to
consider the interests of others. I do not mean to suggest either of those
things by characterizing these interests as “prudential.” I merely mean
to suggest that these interests are motivated by desires that are explicitly
self-regarding: I want this content because I find it valuable and hence
have an interest in obtaining this content.
The strength of the prudential interest varies from one piece of content
to the next. It is reasonable to think that there is some intellectual content
that one needs to survive independently, without direct assistance from
others, in a particular cultural context. For example, although it is possible
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to survive in a society like ours without being able to read or add, one
will require considerable assistance from other people in order to feed,
clothe, and shelter oneself. In most situations in a society like that of the
United States with an inadequate safety net, a person will not be able to
take care of basic needs by herself without knowing how to read and do
simple arithmetic. Obviously, a person will have a strong prudential interest
in such content.
I think it is fair to say that people have a similarly strong prudential
interest in intellectual content having to do with the existence and nature
of God. Regardless of whether one believes or does not believe that a
personal God exists, it should be clear that the various issues are of
tremendous prudential significance. Not surprisingly, people care a
great deal about being able to access intellectual content that will help
them to reach an informed opinion about whether God exists and if so,
what God requires of us. To put it brusquely, atheism and agnosticism
are certainly rational and reasonable positions, but if you do not care at
all whether you might go to hell, then something is seriously wrong with
you.
Not all content, however, has such importance from the standpoint of
self-interest. Some intellectual content is fairly characterized as needed
for individuals to thrive in all the ways that human beings ought to
thrive. Artistic and philosophical content might very well be necessary
for a person to lead a meaningful human life. Without such content, our
lives would be very different—and probably would not be much different
from that of some nonhuman animals. Although theorists disagree on
what sorts of goods are needed to live a genuinely human life and hence
to “thrive,” I would be surprised if anyone denied the claim that some
access to certain kinds of content is needed for people to thrive in the
appropriate ways.
But the vast majority of the intellectual content desired by people is
essential neither to survive nor to thrive. We seek much intellectual content
in order to entertain or amuse ourselves. Most of the time I spend
watching films, for example, is intended to achieve nothing more noble
than to make me laugh or entertain me in some other way. Most of the
time I spend listening to music is intended to create a mood (perhaps one
that is appropriately intense during a workout) or to produce aesthetic
pleasure. The same is true of a fair bit of the time I spend reading; while
much of it is intended to enlighten me, much of it is done for amusement.
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Again, the claim here is not purely descriptive. It is not just that
people tend to care about surviving, knowing about God, thriving, or
being entertained; rather, it is that from the standpoint of prudential
rationality, people ought to care about these things, though not to the same
degree. As noted above, someone who cares nothing about his own
survival is, other things being equal, probably in need of immediate
inpatient psychiatric care, as is probably true of someone who does not
care at all about whether or not a personal God exists who punishes
wrongdoing with everlasting suffering. Likewise someone who does not
care at all about her own amusement or entertainment is, at the very
least, mildly depressed.
As before, these prudential interests seem to have some moral
significance, but how much significance they have from the standpoint
of morality depends on how strong these interests are. It is always a
morally relevant fact about some piece of content that somebody wants
it, but this does not tell us much about how much protection it might
receive from morality. It seems reasonable to think that morality would
afford much more protection to a person’s interest in information
necessary to survive in a self-sufficient way than to his interest in
information necessary to thrive; food, water, shelter, and the truth about
God are much more important than art and philosophy. Likewise, it
seems reasonable to think that morality would afford more protection to
a person’s interest in information necessary to thrive than to a person’s
interest in being entertained or amused, although, again, it is always a
morally relevant fact that some piece of content would amuse a person.
None of this should be taken, of course, to deny that intellectual
content might be protected by morality for some other reason than just
that it has prudential value. For example, intellectual content that people
need to compete in a society like ours might be protected by something
like a principle of equal opportunity. Other things being equal, it is
better from the standpoint of morality that all persons have free access to
such content because a society that does not make it equally available to
all will afford some persons an unfair advantage in the marketplace. Here
the motivation is not to protect the interests of persons, but to ensure that
the distribution of opportunities is fair to all; although we might have a
prudential interest in things being fair, fairness is about something other
than prudential interests. There is nothing in the analysis of this Article
that should be construed as inconsistent with the fact that prudential
considerations might form one part of the explanation as to why some
content gets protection from morality but need not exhaust the explanation.
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D. Weighing the Interests
As is evident from the foregoing discussion, content creators and other
persons have conflicting interests that must be weighed. Content creators
must expend valuable resources in the form of their time, energy, and
labor in order to bring new value into the world in the form of intellectual
content to which people did not previously have access. Content
creators, as we have seen, have a morally protected interest in their time,
energy, and labor, in part because our supply of those resources is limited.
Autonomy rights suggest that they have some claim to control the
disposition of the content they create. Other things being equal, this
suggests that content creators have a limited morally protected interest in
controlling for some reasonable period of time the disposition and
distribution of the value they bring into the world in the form of new
intellectual content.
Of course, other things are not always equal. It is quite reasonable to
think, as noted above, that third parties have a special interest in intellectual
content needed for survival that outweighs whatever interest its author
might have in the value she brings into the world, although this should
not be taken to mean that the author is owed no compensation. It is also
reasonable to think that we owe it to individuals and nations to ensure
that they have sufficient information to compete in a global economy;
this seems to be required by the principle of equal opportunity.76
The distinction between factual intellectual objects and nonfactual
objects is relevant here. It is not unreasonable to think that third parties
have a special interest in important factual information that outweighs
such interests on the part of the author. Facts, after all, are not likely to
lay undiscovered forever, at least not in a culture like ours that is
sufficiently affluent to permit such intellectual endeavors; obviously, if
everyone must spend all their time hunting for food and shelter, they will
not have time to study the world. But in a culture like ours where it is
economically feasible for many persons to engage in academic pursuits,
if one person does not discover some fact, someone else probably will.
This is just not true of nonfactual intellectual objects like novels and
songs. If Dickens does not write A Tale of Two Cities, then it will never
be written; in contrast, if Andrew Wiles does not prove Fermat’s Last

76.
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Theorem, someone else eventually will, though it might take many
additional years.
Two considerations converge here to support the idea that people have
some sort of special interest in factual content discovered or created by
others. First, it is not unreasonable to think that we have some sort of
special interest in knowledge of our world. Second, it is not true that if
one content creator does not produce a particular piece of factual content,
then that piece of content is not likely to be produced; factual content,
again, is different from nonfactual content in that respect. Accordingly,
if it is true that people have some special interest in factual information,
say, because we have some special interest in knowledge about our
world, this would support the altogether plausible claim that, for example, it
is wrong to assign property rights in genetic sequences.
Still, it is not clear that the interests of other persons always outweigh
the interests of a content creator in factual content he creates so as to
preclude any legal protection of the creator’s interest in controlling
disposition of that information. At an intuitive level, there is a world of
difference between factual information needed for survival and factual
information not needed for survival, as well as between factual information
that is readily discovered and factual information that requires some
special talent and effort to discover. Although this should not be taken
to imply that factual content should ever be afforded intellectual property
protection, it is to assert that the issues are different with respect to
nonessential factual content and factual content not easily discovered.
It also seems reasonable to think that the interests of other persons in
content needed to thrive sometimes outweigh the interests of the creator
of that content, but the issues here are just not very clear because the
nature of our interest is just not clear. The fact that we need access to
some artistic content to thrive does not imply that we need access to all
artistic content to thrive.
Indeed, the idea that we need access to all artistic content to thrive is
simply too strong to be plausible. It seems ridiculous, for example, to
assert that I need access to the latest Yelawolf tracks in order to thrive.
Although it might be fun, depending on one’s taste in music, to listen to
Yelawolf’s hillbilly hip-hop, it is simply implausible to think that any
person cannot thrive without free access to it. What this means is that
the interests of other persons in thriving will defeat the interests of
content creators in some but not all cases of artistic content.
Exactly which cases is a difficult issue that would require a much
more detailed analysis than I can pretend to give here, but I would like to
hazard the following observation. It seems plausible to me that what is
currently in the public domain by way of artistic expression is sufficient
to ensure that people thrive in all the ways they ought to thrive. We do
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not need immediately to provide free access to new artistic content to
ensure that all have an adequate opportunity to thrive in the ways that
artistic content enables one to thrive. If this is correct, then the interests
of content creators outweigh the interests of other persons in such content,
at least in cases of content that is of comparatively recent vintage.
But with respect to content that is merely desired, it is not even a close
call. Although it is, as I noted above, always a morally relevant fact that
some agent A wants some thing p, the mere fact that A wants p is not
strong enough to give rise to any significant protection of that interest.
Other things being equal, if (1) A wants p, (2) I can satisfy A’s desire for
p, and (3) A’s desire for p is not illicit, it would be a good thing from the
standpoint of morality for me to provide A with p. But the claim that A
wants p, by itself, does not imply that it would be wrong for me not to
provide A with p if I can do so. Indeed, failure to provide someone with
something they want is not even a property that makes an act wrong;
although it would be good, other things being equal, to provide A with p,
the claim that A wants p does not provide any reason whatsoever for
thinking not providing A with p is even prima facie wrong. Our desires
just cannot do that kind of heavy moral lifting. Indeed, if the desire is
illicit, then there is a significant probability that it would be morally wrong
to satisfy that desire. In contrast, if A needs p, then that fact is at least a
prima facie reason to provide A with p if one can without undue sacrifice.
In cases where content is merely wanted, then, it seems clear that the
interests of the content creators in limited control over the content they
create outweigh the interests of other persons. On the one hand, the
content creator expends precious resources in the form of a limited supply
of life and energy in order to bring value into the world. On the other
hand, other persons want merely to pass the time or enjoy themselves
with such content.
Of course, there might be many people who want the content and just
one content creator whose interests are at stake, but this is not enough to
defeat the content creator’s interest. The content creator interest is
significant enough to receive moral protection: insofar as my behavior
wastes another person’s life or energy, it is morally problematic simply
in virtue of her wanting it. In contrast, the fact that someone wants content
is not significant enough, by itself, to warrant any moral protection:
although it might be good for me to give someone something she wants,
my failure to do so is not even presumptively problematic. An interest
that receives moral protection, like the content creator’s, cannot be
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defeated by aggregating interests that do not; the difference between the
two interests, from a moral point of view, is qualitative and not quantitative.
Ironically, most of the content that critics of intellectual property want
for free is noninformative content that is merely desired. It is reasonable
to think that the vast majority of contemporary music, film, and novels
are wanted primarily for entertainment and amusement. Those people
who are illegally sharing music files online are violating the law for no
better reason than they want to be entertained and to experience the
pleasure of listening to the newest music, as though this desire is so
much more important than the significant investments of the content
creators.
Here it is worth noting that at least with respect to artistic content,
content creators create not only a piece of content, but also the demand
for it. There would be no demand, for example, for A Tale of Two Cities
had Dickens never written that novel. There can be no demand for a
song that has never been written. Although it is true that people want
artistic content and might want content from a particular artist, this desire
has no particular focus until a content creator sharpens it by making
available a suitable piece of content. Artists satisfy wants that they bring
into existence through the creation of value that other people come to
desire. Yet many people believe that these desires, which they would
not have if not for people who create, take precedence over any interests
that an artist has to control the distribution of his creations and the value
that the artist brought into the world. As far as content that is merely
wanted is concerned, this should seem implausible, to put it mildly, as a
matter of morality.77

77. Although I am not prepared to argue the point here, I am inclined to think that
the content creator’s interest rises to the level of a right. The interest we have in the
ideas, time, energy, and intellectual labor we invest in creating new content—and hence
bringing new value into the world—are sufficiently important, it seems to me, to give
rise, irrespective of effects on utility, to a right that binds any third parties who lack any
greater interest in the products of those expenditures than a desire for those products. Of
course, the suggestion that content creators have a right over their products is not to say
anything about the content of that right. In particular, it is not to endorse the conception
of that right that is incorporated into or expressed by copyright law in the United States.
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VIII. WHY LEGAL PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
IS WARRANTED AS A MATTER OF POLITICAL
MORALITY
A. The Relationship Between the Moral Right to Forceful
Defense of Morally Protected Interests and the
Legitimacy of Laws Protecting Such Interests
As noted at the outset of this Article, it is not enough to show that
individuals have a morally protected interest in something to justify legal
protection of that interest. Legal protection of an interest involves the
coercive force of the law to prevent others from violating that interest,
and that requires an argument grounded in political morality.
Locke combined his theory of moral property rights with a social
contract theory of state legitimacy to justify the stronger claim that the
coercive force of the law should be used to protect moral property rights,
but fortunately, a general theory of legitimacy will not be needed to
justify the claim that law should provide limited protection of intellectual
property.
It is enough to note that one of the functions of a legitimate state is to
claim and exercise a limited, morally justified monopoly on the use of
force. People are permitted by morality and by law to resort to force to
defend important moral interests from being violated. But the law does
not permit people to punish violations of these interests after they have
occurred. For example, I may, as a matter of law, use reasonable force
to defend against an assault, but once the assault has occurred, I am
legally prohibited from tracking down the offender and inflicting even
proportionate force after the violation in order to retaliate or punish the
offender. This is the exclusive province of a legitimate state.
Now the issue of what a state may legitimately punish is an issue that
arises in the normative theory of criminal law: what criteria must be
satisfied for the state to criminalize an act given that criminalization and
punishment have such serious consequences on the well-being of the
offender? As noted above, there are different theories that call attention
to different properties of acts that might legitimize criminalization. For
example, John Stuart Mill believes that only acts that harm other people
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may be criminalized.78 It is, however, simply not necessary to ground
the view in any particular theory of criminal law.
It suffices to notice a moral relationship between the moral right to
forcibly defend an interest and the right to punish violations of that
interest. Any interest that rises to the level of such moral importance
that an individual has a moral right to defend against attacks on it by
reasonable force is not only legitimately protected by law but should, as
a matter of political morality, be protected by the law. For example, it is
a commonplace notion that the moral right to life should be protected by
the state, and part of the reason for this is that a person is morally
permitted to use deadly force if necessary to defend her life against a
culpable attack on it. Likewise, it is generally uncontroversial—even if
we do not yet have a successful theory of state legitimacy that would
justify this claim—that the law should protect the moral right to material
property, and in part for the same reason: if people have a morally
protected interest in material property that rises to the level of such
moral importance that people may use reasonable force to protect it, then
that interest should be protected by law. Thus, it would appear that any
morally protected interest important enough to be legitimately defended
by a person through reasonable force should be protected by the law and
its coercive mechanisms, which include punitive and compensatory
remedies.
Indeed, for what it is worth, Locke believes that life in the state of
nature is governed by natural objective moral principles that define the
“natural moral rights” of individuals.79 These rights include rights to
life, liberty, and property.80 Moreover, they include not only a right on
the part of the individual to use proportional force to defend against
culpable attacks on such interests but also a right on the part of the
individual to punish violations of those rights.81 Although Locke’s social
contract theory holds further that citizens deal their natural right to
punish to the state in return for state protection of these rights,82 this is
not a claim that is needed here. All that is needed are the very plausible
claims that (1) from the standpoint of individual morality, a right to
defend against culpable attacks on an interest entails that the act is
rightly punished by someone; and (2) from the standpoint of political

78. See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY AND OTHER WRITINGS 13 (Stefan Collini
ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1989) (1860).
79. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
80. LOCKE, supra note 4, at 5.
81. Id. at 6–7.
82. Id. at 54–56.
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morality, a legitimate state should exercise a monopoly on coercive
punishment with respect to every act that is rightly punished by someone.
There are a couple of reasons for (2) that have nothing to do with the
idea that people have entered into a social contract assigning this
authority to the state; although these reasons would also make it rational
to consent to such a provision in a social contract, it is the reasons
themselves that are doing the work here. First, the point of a legitimate
state is to keep the peace. Allowing individuals to punish wrongdoing
outside an institutional structure like that provided by the state does not
conduce to the purpose of keeping the peace. Second, a legitimate state
is better equipped to get to the truth of the matter by implementing fair
institutional procedures for trying criminal offenses and thus reduces the
probability of unjustly punishing innocent persons.
Here it is especially helpful to note that it is frequently permissible for
people to withhold content they have created from other people. Suppose I
come up with a delicious new recipe that I want to keep to myself—as a
secret family recipe. I cook the dish for you, and you love it. When you
inevitably ask me whether I would give you a copy of the recipe, it is
hard to see how I could have possibly wronged you by declining your
request. All the usual facts about intellectual property obtain, but I am
under no obligation to share this recipe with you.
Should you try to obtain it without my consent, either by violent measures
or nonviolent, underhanded measures, you seem to be committing a wrong.
Indeed, in cases where you try to coerce me to give you the recipe, it
seems clear that I am justified in taking whatever minimal measures I
can to withhold the recipe from you. Comparatively speaking, this is a
trivial problem as concerns the legitimacy of certain acts regarding
intellectual property. As the content becomes more valuable, so is the
wrong committed by someone who tries to obtain it without my consent.
Again, I have a moral permission to defend myself to prevent the
expropriation precisely because it is wrong. And because the expropriation
is wrong and results in harm to me, it should be punished by the state in
at least some circumstances.
One might argue that this is true of ideas that have not been disclosed
but not true of ideas that have been disclosed, but it is difficult to see
why this would be so. Suppose I share the recipe with just my best
friend. How would that act give another person some kind of right to
the recipe? I frame this as a question precisely because I cannot see how
this would make a moral difference. My giving the recipe to my best
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friend does not change whatever interests other people have in that recipe.
The interest other people have in the recipe is nothing more than that it
might lead to a tasty or nutritious meal. Giving the recipe to someone
else does not seem to give rise to some new interest. I may share my
material things with other people, but that does not give anyone else a
new protected interest in my sharing that thing with her.
Now the relevant question is whether an author’s morally protected
interest in content he creates rises to a level of such moral importance
that he may use force to protect against violations of this interest. This
is clearly true of material property. A person may legitimately use force
to defend against having one’s material property stolen precisely because
the interest in material property rises to the level of a right that should be
protected by law. One might think in the case of armed robbery, for
example, that the relevant interest being defended is the right to be free
of coercive threats of harm to the body. This, of course, is surely part of
it but it does not exhaust the whole of it. If a thief is walking out of my
apartment with my television, then I may clearly use defensive measures
to prevent the theft. One of the interests being protected here is clearly
the interest in property; it is not just an interest in personal security.
Likewise, a more complicated variety of examples seem to confirm
that one is morally justified in defending against violations of a morally
protected interest in content one creates in cases where the author’s
interests outweigh the interests of others. For example, an individual
may use reasonable force to prevent someone from using coercive measures
to force the disclosure of, say, a novel the author is writing or has
written—regardless of whether this novel is properly characterized as
property. This applies not only to novels that remain undisclosed, so to
speak, in some form accessible to others but also to novels that have
been memorialized in some form.
Here, it is not just the interest in the material on which the content has
been recorded that affords a right to self-defense; it is also the content
itself. I am not only morally permitted to use reasonable force to defend
against another person’s theft of the material media containing the
content but of the content itself. If I have the score to an original piece
of music scratched in the sand, then I may resort to reasonable measures
to prevent another person simply from looking at the music and walking
away with knowledge of the contents.
Notice, moreover, that if the above is true, then I might waive my right
to defend against unauthorized viewings of the material in exchange for a
payment of a fee. This is exactly the same result that one would get in
thought experiments involving the unauthorized appropriation of material
property. I can defend against trespass onto my home, but my control
over my home also includes the ability to waive my right to defend against
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trespass by giving permission to enter upon the premises. These bundles
of powers and liberties seem clearly to suggest a right to both material
and intellectual “property” that ought to be protected by law. It seems
clear that it is a necessary, if not sufficient, condition of moral legitimacy
that the state, as Locke suggests, protect the natural rights to life, liberty,
and property. No state could be legitimate without protecting the rights to
life, liberty, and property—assuming property is a natural right, as seems
clear, given the right to defend against violations of property interests.
Accordingly, the state seems justified in affording limited legal protection
of intellectual property to content that is merely desired by others for
entertainment purposes. Therefore, I can defend the expenditure of my life
as expressed in content I create with reasonable force. If this is the case,
then it would seem clear that violations of my interest in such content
should receive the coercive protection of the law.
B. The Relationship Between the Content of Property Rights and
Principles of Distributive Justice
Of course, it should not be thought that the individual has an absolute
or utterly unlimited moral right to property or that the state should recognize
and protect an absolute legal right to property. This might be the case,
but it also might not be the case. If people have a positive moral right to
some share of a society’s material resources as a matter of distributive
justice, then the right to property might be outweighed by the right to
some minimum share of the material resources. If this is true, which is
not only intuitively plausible but presupposed by the many forms of
redistributive mechanisms incorporated into U.S. law, then the principles
governing property rights are, in some cases, subordinate to principles of
distributive justice that permit coercive taxation for the purpose of
redistributing property to ensure that these principles are satisfied.
Indeed, it is important to note that the distribution of material resources in
the United States seems to violate the Lockean proviso constraining
legitimate original acquisition to situations in which there is enough of
the same quality of the resources left for others. For example, this
Lockean proviso is inconsistent with the fact that there is no land within
the borders of the United States that remains in the commons. Every
acre of land in the United States is owned by either a private individual
or by the state. The state might make the land publicly accessible through
the establishment of national parks, but this does not amount to keeping
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such land in a protected commons. After all, the uses to which parkland
may be put is governed by federal rules of law.
Although Locke foresees this situation and argues that people have
agreed to such a state of affairs, there are two problems with this move.
First, this agreement is not part of the social contract that justifies the
coercive authority of the state. Under the terms of this social contract,
property is a natural moral right that must be respected by even the state.
It is for this reason that, on Locke’s view, the legitimacy of the state is
subject to the requirement that the law protect the natural rights to life,
liberty, and property. The moral right to property, however, is clearly
constrained by the Lockean proviso. Whatever agreement Locke believes
has been reached by people to justify a state of affairs in which the
commons is utterly depleted, it is not part of the social contract that
legitimizes state authority. The claim that people have reached such an
agreement is purely ad hoc. Indeed, such an agreement creates an artificial
scarcity of material resources; Locke clearly believed that God provided
enough material resources to provide for everyone—which would only
be fair given the Biblical command to be fruitful and multiply. The idea
that it is rational to agree to an economic arrangement that creates material
scarcity that might prevent one from satisfying basic needs seems quite
implausible.
Second, the idea that everyone has given meaningful consent to the
depletion of the material commons is utterly implausible. Every child
born in the United States has been born, without her consent, into a nation in
which there is no material property left in the commons available for
original acquisition. The problem here is not just that children cannot
give meaningful consent. It is also that many adults reject the legitimacy
of a depleted commons. Marxists, for example, would reject the legitimacy
of such a state of affairs.
Locke might respond with a claim that he makes about the original
social contract that provides a general justification of the state authority.
He argues that everyone actually consents, whether expressly or impliedly.
Obviously, not everyone has expressly consented; naturalized citizens,
lawyers, and public officials take an oath, but most adults do not take
such an oath, and the requirement that children recite the Pledge of
Allegiance in school does not constitute meaningful express consent
because minors are limited in their capacity to give meaningful consent.
Locke realizes this and argues that by accepting any benefits of the
law one has impliedly consented. The problem with this view is that it is
impossible not to accept the benefits of the law in the United States, or
any other nation, for that matter. If one breathes, one is benefitted by
laws protecting clean air; it is practically impossible, if not logically so,
for anyone to live in a particular country without deriving some benefit
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from the law. If so, then deriving benefits from the law is not a voluntary
choice. This is problematic in deriving consent from acceptance of the
benefits. For consent to be meaningful, it must be informed and voluntary.
But if one cannot avoid accepting a benefit of law, then doing so is not
voluntary.
One might respond that one can always leave a nation—reminiscent of
an “America: Love it or leave it” worldview—but this is simply false.
People do not have the option to simply leave the country and live
somewhere else, as should be evident from the current debates on
immigration law. Every nation limits immigration by law. Because one
cannot freely avoid accepting the benefits of the law, accepting the benefits
of the law is not voluntary and hence cannot form the foundation for
meaningful consent. It is not only doubtful that all people have expressly or
impliedly accepted state authority as part of the general social contract;
it is equally dubious that people have expressly or impliedly accepted
the idea that land may be accumulated to such an extent that it violates
the Lockean proviso.
Indeed, one reason for thinking redistributive mechanisms would be
justified from a Lockean point of view is precisely that the commons
have been wrongly depleted, and corrective measures must be taken in
the form of coercive redistributive mechanisms; in other words, the
remedy for the depletion of the commons is to try to make reparations,
so to speak, in the form of taxes earmarked for purposes of redistributing
wealth. The point of such measures would not, on a Lockean view, be to
take a legitimate holding of one person who has more property and
transfer it to someone who has less property. It would be to correct the
injustice of one person possessing property to which someone else is
entitled, such as occurs when stolen property is returned to its rightful
owner.
Principles of distributive justice that allow or require such redistribution
should not be thought as inherent in moral property rights or other
similar rights. They are distinct moral principles that limit the amount of
material resources that may legitimately be accumulated by one person.
In a world where everyone is sufficiently affluent, principles of distributive
justice need not require coercive redistributive mechanisms. The right to
property, in such cases, would not be subject to principles of distributive
justice that might otherwise trump property rights. The issue, then, of
whether the law should provide intellectual property is a distinct issue
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from the issue of how much value an individual should be allowed to
accumulate for himself.
IX. AN OBJECTION: LEGAL PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS DEPLETES THE INFORMATION COMMONS
A number of theorists have argued for the claim that there is a morally
protected “information commons.” According to this line of argument,
the class of information objects, or some specific subclass thereof, is a
morally protected resource for all to use—an information commons to
which all have a moral right. Any protection of intellectual property,
then, that gives a right to some person to exclude others from the use of
some informative proposition by requiring a fee has the effect of removing
something from the information commons and thus has the effect of
wrongly depleting it. Therefore, the “commons argument” concludes
that information should be freely available and not subject to intellectual
property protection.
The conception of an information commons that would putatively
defeat the argument for legal protection of intellectual property rights
ultimately derives from the Lockean proviso to his influential justification
of property rights that limits original acquisition to those material objects
for which there is enough and as good left for everyone else. Because
there are limits in a world of scarcity to how much can be removed from
the available resources while leaving enough for others, the effect of this
proviso is to define a morally protected class of resources: a resource
from this class cannot be permissibly appropriated by any one person in
such a way as to exclude other persons from appropriation of that
resource.83 As a matter of moral principle, everyone has a moral right to
use the resources available in the commons.
The justification for the Lockean claim that some class of resources is
a morally protected commons that limits acquisition of that class of
resources presupposes a number of claims. First, it presupposes that
83. It is worth noting that the Lockean proviso is not satisfied by distribution of
material resources in any Western industrialized nation. It is, for example, false that
there is enough unowned land left in any Western nation for everyone else to use
because there is no unowned land and plenty of people who could use land; every acre of
land, at least in the United States, is owned by some private or public entity or person.
Ironically, the Lockean argument for property rights, commonly thought to vindicate the
general structure of property relations in Western nations, seems to ground a radical
critique of the existing distribution of land in these nations—because the ownership of
all land is inconsistent with the Lockean proviso. Similar arguments can probably be
made for other kinds of material resources. This, of course, does not imply that the
critique is correct; it is, however, notable that what people take to be one of the classical
justifications for existing property relations seems to go so far in the direction of vitiating
the existing distribution of resources.
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people have some sort of morally significant interest in the relevant class
of resources; land, for example, is of great importance to human wellbeing. Second, it presupposes that the resource can be appropriated in
such a way as to reduce its supply and cause its depletion. Third, it
presupposes that the relevant resource can also be consumed by members
of the group in another way that does not reduce its supply.84 Fourth, it
presupposes that the relevant resources can be readily appropriated in the
protected way by anyone with access to them; the vistas of a park can be
viewed, for example, by anyone who happens to be there. Finally, it
presupposes that no one has a prior claim to exclude the others from
appropriating the relevant resources in the protected way; the original
humans, for example, had no claim whatsoever to any of the land that forms
part of a land commons.
This version of the commons objection fails, however, because two
conditions are not satisfied. To begin, the second presupposition is not
true regarding information. The class of information resources, properly
described, does not seem to be the kind of thing that can be depleted.
The material resources to which we have access are finite, and any finite
class can, in principle, be depleted. But this does not seem true of
content. If Dickens had taken A Tale of Two Cities out of the commons
by writing it, it is not true that Dickens would have made it unavailable
for free consumption by others; there are, after all, libraries—and A Tale
of Two Cities did not become directly available to people before Dickens
wrote it. More importantly, however, there are an infinite number of
novels that can be written. So by writing a novel and excluding others
from reading it without payment, Dickens has left enough and probably
as good for others. Just as there are an infinite number of novels that can
be written, there are an infinite number of good novels that can be written.
Further, the fourth presupposition is not true of information. As far as
Locke is concerned, picking an apple from a tree constitutes sufficient
labor to create a property right in it. Land, of course, is so readily
available that one simply cannot avoid land. Nothing like this is true of
intellectual objects. It is not true that all propositional objects exist in a
form that can be readily appropriated by anyone who happens to be
exploring it. The proof of Fermat’s Last Theorem, for example, did not
84. On Locke’s view, the world is given to all people to use for their benefit.
Original acquisition of property—acquiring property rights in an object—is different
from use. Acquisition removes the holding from availability for public use, even if the
owner does not put it to productive use.
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become available for consumption, despite the intense labors of
mathematicians for hundreds of years, until Andrew Wiles produced it in
1994.85 A Tale of Two Cities did not become available for consumption
until Charles Dickens produced it. Although it might be true that someone
else would have eventually found a proof for Fermat’s Last Theorem, it
is not true that someone else would have written A Tale of Two Cities
had Dickens not done so. The probability of someone else independently
composing a perfect copy of what is A Tale of Two Cities is so low as to
be morally negligible.
Of course, these propositional objects might have already existed as
abstract objects in logical space prior to their creation or discovery, but
the important, interesting, nonobvious propositional objects cannot be
readily consumed by people until someone, through the expenditure of
her labor, makes it available to other people. The intellectual commons,
unlike the land commons, is not a resource already there waiting to be
appropriated by anyone who happens to be there; it is stocked by and
only by the activity of human beings. Although people can improve the
value of land, they cannot make land; in contrast, people can and do
make novels, music, proofs, theories, et cetera, and if someone does not
make a particular novel, it is not available for human consumption, even
if it exists, so to speak, somewhere in logical space.
X. A QUALIFICATION: POLITICAL MORALITY AND THE CONTENT OF A
SPECIFIC BODY OF EXISTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW
The claim that the interests of authors in their creations ought, as a
matter of political morality, to be protected by law does not imply that
the content of any specific body of intellectual property law is morally
justified. There are many impermissible ways of trying to realize an end
that is morally justified. The fact that someone has a legitimate moral
interest in something does not give the state carte blanche to do anything
it wants by way of protecting that interest. For this reason, the issue of
whether intellectual property law as currently formulated is morally
justified, then, is a different issue from the issue of whether states ought,
as a matter of political morality, to protect these interests.
A number of elements of existing intellectual property law have been
subjected to trenchant criticism by theorists who seem to accept the
legitimacy of at least some intellectual property protection.86 In The

85. See Andrew Wiles, Modular Elliptic Curves and Fermat’s Last Theorem, 141
ANNALS MATHEMATICS 443 (1995).
86. See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN
A CONNECTED WORLD (2001); JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT (2001).
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Future of Ideas, for example, Lawrence Lessig rejects the idea that
intellectual property protection should afford an author “perfect control”
over the content he has created.87 On Lessig’s view, existing intellectual
property law goes much too far in affording authors control over the
disposition of their contents and has the effect of inhibiting innovation
and thereby diminishing the well-being of other persons. For example,
the Copyright Term Extension Act affords twenty years of additional
copyright protection to individual and corporate authors without obvious
justification;88 the effect is to make it that much more difficult for
innovators to utilize past innovations to create new technologies.
Another influential book, Digital Copyright, focuses more narrowly
on particular flaws in U.S. copyright law.89 In this work, Jessica Litman
argues that many elements of U.S. copyright law are obscure, unjustified,
controversial, and even arbitrary. For example, she rejects the legitimacy of
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, which prohibits efforts to circumvent
technologies designed to prevent copyright infringement.90 Litman
recognizes the interests of content creators in preventing copyright
infringement, but plausibly argues that the law illegitimately restricts
morally fair uses and thereby violates the interests of third parties. Like
Lessig, Litman believes that intellectual property protection should not
afford an author absolute control over the contents she has created.91
There are other elements of intellectual property law in the United
States that one might plausibly believe go too far, even on the assumption
that the law should provide some protection of an author’s interest in
content she has created. Here are just a couple of interesting examples
from the world of sports. Pat Riley has copyright protection for the
phrase three-peat,92 while Texas A&M University received a trademark
in 1990 for 12th man—a phrase that had been used for many years by
other universities and professional football teams to refer to the role that

87. See LESSIG, supra note 86, passim.
88. Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat.
2827 (1998) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 302).
89. LITMAN, supra note 86.
90. Id. at 27–28.
91. See Richard A. Spinello, The Future of Intellectual Property, 5 ETHICS & INFO.
TECH. 1 (2003), for an extended review of these two works.
92. Any Three-Peat Pays Riley, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 1993, at L29, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/1993/05/22/sports/any-three-peat-pays-riley.html.
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spectators play in the outcome of a football game.93 A complete overview
of potentially problematic elements of U.S. law is not possible here; for
our purposes, the most important point is that one can believe that authors
have interests that deserve legal protection without thereby committing
oneself to accepting the content of any existing body of intellectual
property law. The general issue of whether intellectual property protection
is morally justified is different from the more specific issue of whether
some particular body of intellectual property law is morally justified.
Finally, if as seems reasonable assuming that there are intellectual
property rights, there should, as a matter of individual and political
morality, be temporal limits on how long someone can legitimately have
intellectual property rights in some content. The idea that intellectual
property rights should last even a lifetime is not obvious. Even less
obvious is the idea that they should extend beyond the life of the content
creator. Once the content creator dies, there is no rights holder; only
persons have rights, and death extinguishes the existence of the person.
Thus, many of the people who have contributed content that has influenced
A’s creation of a particular piece of content no longer have intellectual
property rights in the content that influenced A. For this reason, there is
no reason to think that the fact that content has been influenced entails
that it is a social product incompatible with assigning intellectual
property rights to A.
Here it is important to recall that there are multiple legitimizing purposes
of the state that have to be balanced. Sometimes a morally protected
interest will justifiably receive less legal protection than the moral
protection because the state’s purpose in promoting the public good wins
over the state’s purpose in giving legal protection to morally protected
interests. Such cases might require the state to allow for fair use exceptions
and other qualifications that might seem incompatible with a deontological
justification for the idea that one has a morally protected interest in
intellectual property. In reality, there is no incompatibility between such
exceptions and a deontological justification for the idea that content
creators have a morally protected interest in intellectual property.
XI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
In this Article, I have surveyed and evaluated the various arguments
for and against intellectual property protection, concluding that some
intellectual property protection is morally legitimate. In particular, I have
argued that the interests that content creators have in the content they
93. Seahawks, A&M Resolve ‘12th Man’ Dispute, ESPN (May 8, 2006, 11:36 PM),
http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=2437992.
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create or discover outweigh the interests of other persons in all cases not
involving content that is necessary for human beings to survive, thrive,
or flourish in certain important ways. It is true, of course, that the claim
that an author’s interest outweighs third-party interests in certain kinds
of content does not clearly imply that the author has a moral right to
intellectual property. Nevertheless, such a claim surely provides a strong
reason for affording some stringent legal protection to the interests of
content creators in the contents of their creations. One reasonable way
to do so is to allow authors limited control over the disposition of their
creations.
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